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Stephany Griffith-Jones, Eric Helleiner 
and Ngaire Woods
At their April 2009 summit in London, the G20 leaders 
announced their first major international governance 
innovation: the creation of the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). This body replaced the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF) which had been created almost exactly ten years 
earlier in the wake of the 1997-1998 East Asian financial 
crisis. Responding to the 2007-2009 global crisis, the G20 
leaders gave the FSB a stronger mandate to promote 
global financial stability, a wider membership and a 
more sophisticated internal organizational structure 
than its predecessor. The FSB was even described 
soon afterwards by US Treasury Secretary Geithner as 
“in effect, a fourth pillar” of the architecture of global 
economic governance, alongside the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (US Treasury, 2009). 
Expectations are high for the new institution. Its 
creators hope it will be more effective than the FSF in 
encouraging compliance with international standards. 
Some hope that the FSB will lead the way on global 
macroprudential regulation, jointly with institutions like 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
Many are now beginning to ask what kind of power 
and authority the FSB should have, and with what 
implications for its governance structure. This new pillar 
of global economic governance is being further shaped 
as this publication goes to press. Our hope is that this 
compilation of short memos, produced a year or so after 
the FSB’s creation, will promote further debate over the 
mandate, legitimacy, governance and effectiveness of the 
institution. Before summarizing their arguments, let us 
provide a brief overview of the FSB’s existing mandate, 
membership and organizational structure. 
What is the FSB? 
The FSB is mostly a coordinator. According to its 
Charter, the FSB has been established “to coordinate 
at the international level the work of national financial 
authorities and international standard setting 
bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the 
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory 
and other financial sector policies. ” In addition, the 
institution is to work with the international financial 
institutions to “address vulnerabilities affecting financial 
systems in the interest of global financial stability. ” 
The FSB’s mandate includes: 1) assessing vulnerabilities 
affecting the global financial system and the regulatory, 
supervisory and related actions needed to address them; 
2) promoting coordination and information exchange 
among authorities responsible for financial stability; 3) 
monitoring markets and advising on the implications of 
market developments for regulatory policy; 4) generating 
best practices by advising on and monitoring best practice 
in meeting regulatory standards; 5) undertaking joint 
strategic reviews of the policy development work of 
the international standard setting bodies to ensure their 
work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities and 
addressing gaps; 6) helping to establish supervisory 
colleges; 7) assisting cross-boarder crisis management 
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by supporting contingency planning particularly with 
respect to systemically important firms; 8) conducting 
Early Warning Exercises in collaboration with the IMF; 9) 
enhancing coherence among standard-setting bodies by 
helping to coordinate their activities and address overlaps 
or gaps between national and regional regulatory 
structures relating to prudential and systemic risk, 
market integrity and investor and consumer protection, 
infrastructure, as well as accounting and auditing. 
To perform these tasks, FSB has only a tiny staff compared 
to the IMF, World Bank and WTO. It reports to the G20 
leaders, but lacks any formal power and its creation has 
not been ratified by any national legislature. It is designed 
to act more as a loose network of various national 
policy makers (from ministries of finance, central banks, 
supervisory and regulatory authorities) and international 
officials concerned financial stability issues rather than a 
substantial inter-governmental institution along the lines 
of the other three pillars of global economic governance. 
The membership of the FSB expands significantly on that 
of the FSF. The small club of countries - the G7 countries, 
Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Singapore, and 
Switzerland (the European Central Bank has also been 
a member) – has now been joined by the rest of the G20 
countries, Spain and the European Commission. Like the 
FSF, the FSB also includes representatives of international 
financial institutions (the IMF, WB, Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)) as well as key SSBs and 
central bank bodies, including the BCBS, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS). 
Decisions are made using a more formal structure than 
the FSF. All the members participate in the FSB’s plenary 
which operates on the basis of consensus. The FSB has a 
full-time Secretary General, Secretariat, Chair, Steering 
Committee, various Standing Committees and working 
groups. The FSB’s Charter also includes provisions 
for “other stakeholders including private sector and 
non-member authorities” to be consulted and for non-
members to be included, on an ad hoc basis, in its working 
groups, standing committees and plenary meetings. 
The FSB imposes certain responsibilities on its members 
(the FSF did not). Jurisdictions commit to “pursue the 
maintenance of financial stability” and “maintain the 
openness and transparency of the financial sector.” 
More specifically, they also agree to “implement 
international financial standards,” including 12 core 
standards that had been promoted by the FSF since 
the late 1990s as well as new standards that the FSB 
creates. They must also “undergo periodic peer reviews, 
using among other evidence IMF/World Bank public 
Financial Sector Assessment Program [FSAP] reports. 
”In January 2010 FSB members also agreed to undergo 
an FSAP assessment every five years, and to publicize 
the detailed IMF/WB assessments used as a basis for 
the IMF’s Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs) which summarize countries’ compliance 
levels with international standards. In March 2010 the 
FSB members outlined their ultimate goal “to promote 
adherence by all countries and jurisdictions to regulatory 
and supervisory standards concerning international 
cooperation and information exchange.”
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
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What Challenges Does the FSB Face?
The memos in this collection identify a number of key 
challenges for the FSB. Although their analyses are 
interrelated, we have divided the memos into three 
broad categories. The first set address some broad issues 
relating to the authority and governance of the FSB. The 
second set are concerned principally with the role of 
the FSB in encouraging compliance with international 
standards. The final group focus on challenges relating 
to FSB’s efforts to address macroprudential issues. 
Authority and Governance 
The FSB’s potential does not look bright when viewed 
through a historical lens. Louis Pauly’s opening essay 
notes that the FSB shares some similarities with the 
ineffective League of Nations’ Economic and Financial 
Organization (EFO) which also had a tiny staff, operated 
with consensus rules, and focused on the promotion of 
best practices. He recalls how policy makers at the 1944 
Bretton Woods conference had improved on the EFO’s 
weaknesses by creating the IMF with substantial resources, 
a large secretariat, rules-based collaboration and political 
legitimacy. With its small secretariat and focus on non-
binding networked-based cooperation, the FSB looks to 
Pauly like a “historical reversion” to the League model 
and he worries that it lacks sufficient authority to play 
a significant role in global financial governance. For this 
reason, he argues that the IMF must remain the core of 
global financial governance, and urges that the FSB’s 
work on prudential regulation be embedded in larger 
macroeconomic policy collaboration. 
Some of Pauly’s concerns are echoed in Andrew Baker’s 
memo. Ruthless truth-telling is the key to effective peer 
review and early warning, yet these are unlikely to occur 
unless the FSB is enabled to convey messages that are 
politically unpopular to member countries, especially 
the major powers. These messages might include the 
highlighting of regulatory or supervisory weaknesses 
or the need to “lean against the wind” during financial 
booms. The consensus rule of the FSB’s plenary could 
prevent it from performing these functions effectively 
because countries may stifle or dilute the FSB’s warnings 
or prevent the institution from playing an independent 
and active role. Baker recommends that a bar be set 
where vetos can be exercised over specific findings 
or messages only when a critical number of states is 
opposed. We would note that the strongest form of this 
is the reverse consensus rule deployed for accepting the 
adjudication of disputes in the WTO where rejection 
requires consensus. Baker also suggests that the BIS 
research department be given a more formal role in 
supporting the FSB, given the high quality of its analysis 
in the lead-up to the 2007-2009 crisis. 
Developing countries’ participation has been neglected in 
the debate over the FSB. Alejandro Vanoli from Argentina 
focuses on representation within the organization. He 
applauds the widening of the membership of the FSB 
but notes that many developing countries still remain 
excluded from its discussions. Because international 
financial stability is of concern to all countries, he calls 
for a more representative model of governance. He 
highlights the fact that although the membership of the 
FSB has widened, this has not yet brought about much 
change in terms of the issues discussed. The FSB is still 
focused on subjects that are most relevant to developed 
countries. Vanoli calls for developing countries to work 
together to push for a wider agenda that reflects their 
common problems and helps recover the original spirit 
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of Bretton Woods which put the international financial 
system “at the service of the balanced development of 
trade, production and employment. ” 
Eric Helleiner focuses on a number of governance 
challenges associated with the FSB’s role vis-à-vis 
international prudential standards. He notes that the FSB 
has tried to overcome the weaknesses of the FSF through 
its wider membership, its new mechanisms to promote 
compliance, and its greater focus on macroprudential 
issues. He strongly underlines the importance of Vanoli’s 
call to re-examine the narrow country membership of 
the FSB and to increase the voice of new developing 
country members within the organization. These 
concerns are also strongly shared by the two co-editors, 
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Ngaire Woods who also 
note that all the FSB’s Standing Committees are chaired 
by developed country representatives. Helleiner also 
identifies important weaknesses in the FSB’s capacity 
to achieve its main goal – the promotion of compliance 
with international standards. He notes that the FSB has 
four new mechanisms for promoting compliance with 
international standards: the mandatory regular FSAPs; 
the membership obligations to implement international 
standards; the peer review process; and efforts to tackle 
non-cooperating jurisdictions. But each suffers key 
flaws. Finally, in discussing macroprudential regulation, 
Helleiner highlights the ambiguous relationship of 
the FSB to the international standard-setting bodies, 
and the risk of “capture” of the regulatory process 
by private actors. All in all, these concerns highlight 
the urgency of evolving the governance of the FSB to 
ensure its effectiveness. 
Surveillance, Peer Review and 
International Standards 
The next three memos explore the FSB’s capacity to 
encourage compliance with international financial 
standards. Andrew Walter focuses on the political 
difficulties associated with this task. Because aggressive 
enforcement regimes will be resisted and are 
unworkable, he notes that attention must be devoted to 
surveillance regimes. The main targets of international 
financial surveillance since the late 1990s were the 
emerging market countries and offshore centres. In 
the wake of the 2007-2009 crisis, Walter argues that the 
focus must now be more squarely on the major powers. 
Before the crisis, the FSAP process was weakened by 
the refusal particularly of the US and a number of other 
G20 countries, (such as Argentina, China and Indonesia) 
to participate. Peer surveillance within the G7 was too 
often simply a “cease-fire agreement to avoid sensitive 
policy issues. ” If the FSB is to be successful, Walter (in 
agreement with Baker, mentioned above) argues that it 
must establish an independent and robust surveillance 
process that applies especially to major powers. One of 
its first key tests, he suggests, will be the FSAP that the 
US has committed to. 
The politics of policy coordination and surveillance are 
also the focus of Bessma Momani’s memo. As the crisis 
moment wanes, she worries FSB members may no 
longer uphold commitments they have made to undergo 
FSAPs and release the results because of sovereignty 
concerns. The peer review process and commitments 
to international standards will also be complicated 
by domestic and international politics. Domestic 
politicians and interest groups are likely to balk at the 
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
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idea of accepting advice from the FSB. International 
political rivalries and distinct national interests may also 
undermine the FSB’s efforts to encourage information 
sharing and oversight of national policies. On top of the 
problems caused by these intractable political realities, 
Momani highlights the challenges of coordinating IMF 
and FSB work in this area given their different locations, 
sizes and organizational cultures. 
A more positive outlook is sketched by Tony Porter who 
focuses on the FSB’s new peer review process, arguing 
that there are lessons to be learned from the experiences of 
transnational peer reviews in other contexts. Porter notes 
that transnational peer review processes can establish 
shared expectations and commitments in ways that are 
more effective than traditional international law in a world 
in which problems, interests and the relevant actors are not 
clearly defined and are changing rapidly. They can also 
reduce the risk of capture by business interests by forcing 
policy makers to justify their conduct to knowledgeable 
peers. If FSB members are to engage seriously in the 
process, however, the choice of thematic topics must 
reflect the concerns of different powerful subgroups of 
G20 members over time. Porter also suggests that this 
serious engagement could be encouraged by making 
membership in the FSB renewable every five years, and 
by establishing gradations in membership rights linked 
to records of compliance. This could be an innovative 
way to enforce the membership obligations embodied in 
the FSB’s Charter but which, as yet, have no enforcement 
mechanism. Porter proposes that in order to allow peer 
reviews to encourage learning, collegiality and trust, part 
of the review process should be confidential and any 
compliance mechanisms should not be linked too directly 
to any specific peer review but rather to good faith efforts 
of states to engage with peer review processes over time. 
Porter also stresses the importance of the FSB having a 
strong secretariat, with staff from diverse backgrounds 
that can support the whole process. 
The Challenge of 
Macroprudential Regulation 
The final four memos explore the challenge of 
macroprudential regulation. Before the 2007-2009 crisis, 
international financial regulation had a microprudential 
focus that concentrated on the health and stability of 
individual institutions. The crisis highlighted the need 
to complement this approach with a macroprudential 
one that addressed systemic risks. The G20 leaders have 
assigned the FSB (along with other institutions such 
as the BIS and SSBs, especially the BCBS) the task of 
developing specific macroprudential tools, such as those 
mitigating pro-cyclicality and addressing the treatment 
of systemically important institutions, instruments and 
markets. While there is strong political support for the 
new macroprudential philosophy, its implemention is 
raising some technical challenges and political resistance 
from financial interests that would be affected. 
Philip Turner explains how the new macroprudential 
regulation rests on a recognition of the existence of both 
externalities and pro-cyclicality in the financial system. 
The former can arise from interconnections, network 
effects, and market power, while the latter refers to the 
tendency of financial systems to amplify macroeconomic 
or global financial shocks. He identifies three unresolved 
policy challenges relating to the implementation of 
macroprudential policies: Should prudential ratios vary 
through the cycle, or be fixed? How many instruments 
should be chosen and should they be sector and/
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or bank specific? What is the relationship between 
macroprudential and macroeconomic policies? Turner 
notes that international consensus may be difficult to 
reach on these questions because policies that work 
well in one jurisdiction may not do so elsewhere. He 
also notes the difficulties posed by sparse evidence 
on how different instruments have worked, and by 
the complexities of measuring systemic risks and the 
impact of macroprudential policies. For these reasons, 
he suggests that new policies will involve trial and error 
and that policy makers need to be ready to reassess as 
new information appears. 
Stephany Griffith-Jones focuses more specifically on 
counter-cyclical regulation that is designed to discourage 
booms and busts. She highlights the need for both rules 
and global coordination. Possible policy initiatives 
in this area include rules relating to capital, loan loss 
provisioning (as the Spanish have used for almost ten 
years rather successfully), leverage ratios, and liquidity. 
She argues that counter-cyclical regulation needs to be 
applied comprehensively across all institutions, markets 
and instruments to prevent regulatory arbitrage. She 
also highlights the need for regulation to be based on 
rules, rather than discretion, in order to reduce the risk of 
regulatory capture by financial interests and by the over-
enthusiasm characterizing booms; she argues that rules 
could be tightened when circumstances require it (for 
example, very strong growth of credit) but not relaxed. 
Because counter-cyclical regulation may affect access to 
credit, instruments may need to be developed to ensure 
adequate supply of longterm credit to small and medium-
sized firms. Although counter-cyclical regulation needs 
to be implemented nationally via host countries, Griffith-
Jones argues that the FSB has an important role to play 
in coordinating broad criteria internationally to prevent 
contagion from poorly regulated jurisdictions and to 
address incentives that firms may face to borrow abroad. 
Emerging economies are the focus of Roberto Zahler’s 
analysis. Although many favour rules over discretion in 
the implementation of counter-cyclical policies, Zahler 
notes that discretion is needed in emerging economies 
because of the speed and strength of cycle phases. He 
also notes that macroprudential regulation in emerging 
economies must move beyond just addressing the 
economic cycle and banks’ maturity mismatches to focus 
on ensuring that key macro prices (especially the real 
interest rate and exchange rate) do not become outliers. 
He argues that the macroprudential agenda must allow 
for the legitimacy of national regulations on short-term 
financial inflows in emerging economies because they 
can create destabilizing asset price bubbles. Zahler also 
highlights the need for the FSB to be independent in 
carrying out its assessments of macroprudential risks 
and proposing policies. FSB analyses, evaluations and 
proposals relating to macroprudential risks should also 
be incorporated into FSAPs, and the surveillance of all 
countries – including the US, UK and eurozone – needs 
to be strengthened. 
Finally, Pierre Siklos steps back to highlight the need 
for maintaining internally consistent core principles 
of sound macroprudential management that are 
periodically evaluated. He also calls our attention to 
the importance of monetary policy frameworks and the 
need for clarity on the relationship between financial 
stability goals and monetary policy. Rather than seeing 
financial stability as a separate objective for monetary 
policy, Siklos argues that central banks should seek 
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alternative monetary policy strategies that minimize 
the occurrence of conditions that threaten financial 
system stability. He suggest that serious consideration 
be given to price level targeting as one such alternative. 
Siklos also suggests that the FSB could play a useful role 
in ensuring that appropriate distance exists between 
central banks and the fiscal authorities, by encouraging 
the clarification of the location of accountability during 
crisis situations and the limits of monetary policy 
interventions in private markets. 
Conclusion 
Taken together, these memos identify some serious 
challenges ahead for the FSB. They also highlight some 
concrete directions for developing the institution. Most 
agree that to be an effective monitor for all countries 
pursuing financial stability, the FSB needs a loud whistle, 
and the authority, expertise and support of its members to 
blow the whistle, even if the offender is a powerful country. 
Perhaps here the FSB will draw strength from numbers, 
underlining the need for the institution fully to engage and 
gain support from a wider membership. The FSB could 
begin more fully to leverage the experience of peer review 
in other forums, to build up its capacity, and to formalize 
its authority. If rapid efforts are not made to address 
weaknesses, the FSB may suffer the fate of its predecessor, 
the FSF, an institution that clearly failed to meet the high 
hopes of many of its creators, even though it produced 
often excellent studies warning of systemic risks that were 
not acted upon. If these challenges are met effectively, then 
the FSB will stand a better chance of emerging into the 
role of a more substantial fourth pillar of global economic 
governance. This could be of great benefit to achieving 
greater national and global financial stability. 
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The Financial 
Stability Board in 
Context 
Louis W. Pauly
Jacques Polak almost lived long enough to celebrate 
his 96th birthday. One of the most distinguished 
macroeconomists of his generation, and a founding 
father of international monetary economics, his career 
began in the League of Nations in 1937. In 1947 he 
joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as 
chief of the statistics division. In 1958 he took over its 
Research Department and turned it into an intellectual 
powerhouse. In 1981 he became the Dutch Executive 
Director, and from 1987 until 2007, eminent adviser 
and teacher to many managing directors and staff 
members. For me as well as for many others, Polak and 
his equally distinguished legal counterpart, Sir Joseph 
Gold, embodied an era, a global liberal ethic and a great 
tradition of international public service. 
On one historical and analytical point, Polak and I had 
a longstanding difference of opinion, and we would 
return to it in public and in private many times over 
the years. I think that difference is quite relevant to the 
subject of this volume: the mandate and the prospects 
for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as a fourth pillar 
of global economic governance. 
In my dialogue with Polak, I depicted the history of global 
economic and financial governance – of the post-war 
history of the Fund, and the UN system of which it remains 
a part – as continuous with the history of the League. The 
connection was not just symbolic. The League’s economic 
and financial files, for example, were passed on to the 
UN, and certain officials, like Polak and his friend, the 
late, great Canadian, Louis Rasminsky, took their League 
experience with them directly into the Bretton Woods 
negotiations and then into the nascent IMF. 
Polak, on the other hand, saw a significant turning point 
occurring with the establishment of the Fund. The word 
he and Gold preferred to use to describe the Fund’s basic 
function neatly encapsulated the different character 
of post-war monetary arrangements. The word was 
“regulation. ”When the Bretton Woods exchange rate 
system finally broke down in 1973 and there was nothing 
for the Fund to regulate, Polak and Gold regretted the 
situation but, along with the future managing director, 
Jacques de Larosière, they embraced without enthusiasm 
the looser notion that the Fund would provide “firm 
surveillance” of a stable system of exchange rates. Where 
Gold emphasized the fact that a novel legal basis for 
this function remained distinctive, Polak believed that 
by virtue of its mandate, staff, and financial resources, 
the Fund remained in an historically unique position to 
promote collaborative balance of payments adjustment. 
In contrast, he felt that the League had been too ”political,” 
as in not professional and not in a strong position to 
advocate the subordination of narrow national interests 
to common global interests. The League lacked clear 
authority. Its consensus decision-making practice made 
it too cautious, and it often could not rise above petty 
concerns. Despite some modest successes in the 1920s, 
when systemic financial emergencies arose, it found 
itself on the sidelines, without resources and without 
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legitimacy. Its small economic staff, of which Polak 
was a member, had by the 1930s mainly an analytical 
mission, and in the end it contributed little to the cause 
of systemic stabilization in practice. More than once, 
Polak recalled for me the image of Alexander Loveday, 
the last head of the economic and financial organization 
of the League, spending a lot of time in the lobby of the 
Mount Washington Hotel, with no one paying him any 
attention. In fact, Polak disliked what historians had long 
ago come to call the EFO (that is, the League’s Economic 
and Financial Organization). He felt that acronym was 
too grand, and he believed that no such organization 
ever existed notwithstanding important work by League 
staffers on issues like public health, child nutrition, 
and human trafficking, work to which Rasminsky 
contributed and work that would continue after the war 
in various agencies of the United Nations. 
The Fund, on the other hand, was different. Polak and 
Gold both insisted so. Again, it had authority delegated 
by ratified treaty, a decision-making process unbound 
by a unanimity principle, financial resources to support 
its mandate, and, most importantly, a highly qualified, 
knowledgeable, technocratic, legally independent and 
politically neutral staff. 
Although I very much valued and respected the ideal 
lying behind that perspective, I interpreted that result 
differently. That the League staff seemed “political” 
was a function of the character of the dominant civil 
service bureaucracy lying behind it, namely the British 
civil service with its tradition of gentlemen generalists 
seeking consensus and doing whatever needed to be 
done. Pragmatism ruled, and principles often had 
to be stretched to cover facts. Certainly the League 
reflected the rather open-ended liberal internationalist 
ethos of the post-1918 era, and the Fund was shaped 
by a more directive Keynesianism. But Keynes himself 
was unhappy with the way his ideal was in fact 
translated into reality. That the Fund was structured 
very differently from the League, I argued, was mainly 
a function of now-dominant American bureaucratic 
norms; that is, the attempt to resolve fundamental 
distributive contests through formally transparent legal 
and market mechanisms and, in all but exceptional 
circumstances defined mainly by overriding American 
security policies, to limit direct political interference by 
delegating authority to technical experts. 
Nevertheless, I think that Polak and I agreed that the 
fundamental objective of both the League and the Fund 
was the same ― ever more open economies converging 
on relatively liberal principles, boundless prosperity, 
at least among those human populations capable 
of disrupting international security, and resource 
redistribution sufficient to keep nationalist/mercantilist 
alternatives at bay. I think we agreed that the world was 
better off with the Fund than without it—especially 
during emergencies, when its staff was available to 
facilitate burden-sharing by member-states and to 
serve as scapegoats for unpleasant decisions taken 
within those states. With such a practical legacy, the 
Bretton Woods Agreement and its amendment in 1976 
did represent signal evolutionary steps toward a more 
integrated world. 
Although the League may have foreshadowed those 
steps, joining the Fund did mean that member-states 
accepted obligations to account to one another for the 
external consequences of national economic policies. 
Part I: Authority and Governance cigionline.org 15
The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance?
Since they remained ultimately responsible only to 
their own citizens, the key to making those obligations 
substantive and as effective as possible was the Fund 
staff, even if they were and had to be “political” in a 
more subtle sense than their predecessors in the League. 
Only they, following norms made legitimate by their 
conformity with the way the leading member of the 
system made basic decisions of political economy, could 
make operational the idea of meaningful accountability 
without final responsibility. They were the institutional 
memory, they kept the files, they compiled the facts, they 
gathered the data, they recorded promises made, and 
they could monitor compliance. In short, as permanent 
employees of an intergovernmental organization that 
would be difficult to deconstruct, only they could 
hold as disinterested a position as possible, and from 
that position only they could credibly hold the feet 
of national leaders as close as possible to the fire on 
commitments easy to make in a global setting and even 
easier to forget back home. Perhaps the staff of the Fund 
became too certain of themselves after various successes 
in defusing sovereign debt crises in the 1980s. Perhaps 
they were pushed too far by American policy makers in 
the Asian and Russian crises of the late 1990s. But they 
remain today in a unique position to help steer a system 
grappling with old and new risks in a still-integrating 
world economy. 
It is precisely in this light that the main flaw of the 
multilateral process leading to the establishment of 
the FSB becomes visible. Without disrespecting the 
admirable work of the sincere and qualified people now 
associated with it, the small, impermanent and very 
loosely mandated staff of the FSB suggests an historical 
reversion. I do not know what Polak would have said 
about it, but it is only too easy to imagine the equivalent 
of the FSB being created by and within the League, say 
around 1922, when Arthur Salter became director of the 
Economic, Financial, and Transit Section of the Secretariat. 
A plenary body agreeing on policies by consensus, a 
chair dealing with the politics associated with the quest 
for unanimity, a secretary general with very limited 
powers, a tiny and mainly analytical secretariat, and the 
expectation of the voluntary implementation of “best 
practices” by autonomous national authorities. This was 
the essence of the League’s core economic and financial 
machinery. 
With memories of what happened to that machinery 
after 1931 deep in the background, the Fund’s 
macroeconomic mandate was adapted in 1976 to take 
account of what was by then becoming the main driver 
of global integration, namely more open capital markets 
and a vast expansion in international capital flows. 
Despite the failure of an attempt to actually amend 
the Articles to make the Fund’s mandate in this regard 
explicit, Polak contended that the Fund by then already 
had all the delegated power it needed to incorporate 
finance into its surveillance activities. Ultimately, global 
finance has consequences for national current accounts, 
the Fund’s core terrain. The problem is that many 
members bridled at this idea then, and they continue to 
do so today. A focus on macroeconomic outcomes cannot 
fail to implicate the need for better financial regulatory 
and supervisory policies and for better coordination of 
those policies across national borders. Underneath such 
macroprudential concerns, however, there is no denying 
the fiscal and monetary bedrock upon which they rest. 
That connection became crystal clear in the rolling crisis 
that began in US housing markets in the summer of 
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2007. At the point of maximum systemic danger and 
successful containment, decisive fiscal and monetary 
actions were required and delivered. Aside from military 
actions, nothing comes closer to the heart of state 
sovereignty. In short, prudential failures in integrating 
financial markets necessitate the most sensitive political 
responses. As Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker 
have long argued, it would be better for the system if a 
recognition of this reality led to ex ante understandings 
on fiscal and monetary burden-sharing during financial 
emergencies. Our recent experience, however, suggests 
that even in limited regional settings like Europe, where 
such coordination should by now be routine, the best 
that national authorities are thus far able to deliver is ad 
hoc and contentious burden sharing at the moment of 
most extreme danger. In the shadow of 1931, this may be 
understood as modest progress. Moving much further, 
however, takes institutional machinery, not informal, 
good-faith understandings. 
Domestic political sensitivities surely explain why even 
states leading the charge toward financial globalization 
have for many years now preferred to deal with prudential 
policies and their implications in very restricted fora. 
They also surely help explain their reluctance seriously 
to empower the international staff required to hold them 
accountable to one another on financial regulatory and 
supervisory issues. A close observer recently told me 
that the professional economists in the secretariat of the 
FSB now number eight. That staff is planned to increase 
to12 and eventually to as many as 16. As far as I know, 
moreover, there are no plans to make permanent even 
that embryonic core of a potential future organization. 
Those economists are seconded for relatively short 
periods of time from national central banks, from the 
still-small staff of the Bank for International Settlements, 
which hosts the FSB, and perhaps in the future from 
national financial supervisors. A pretty narrow base for 
a fourth pillar!
It is nevertheless hard to argue that the transformation of 
the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB is not a good 
development. Surely given the complicated technical 
issues involved, more and higher-profile scrutiny of 
macroprudential issues must be positive. But if its work 
allows member-states to render even more obscure the 
intimate connection between financial regulation and 
supervision and core macroeconomic policies, the risk 
is that we may not be so lucky during the next global 
emergency. How easy it was to reach agreement at the 
level of principle on the importance of free competition 
and sound markets at the Geneva summit of 1927. 
How easy it was then to pass on responsibility for 
implementation to the inadequate staff of the League. 
When they failed, how easy it was to convene a new 
conference of leaders at London in 1933. 
We are, I trust, in more fortunate global economic 
circumstances today. But the emergency of 2008 did 
succeed in reminding us that a stable global economy 
ultimately requires a robust and reliable system for 
fiscal and monetary coordination. At the same time, it 
called into question the wisdom of relying on certain 
assumptions based on our recent experience: that US 
taxpayers directly or indirectly will in the future be 
willing to bail out foreign financial intermediaries, as 
they did in the case of AIG’s counterparties; that the 
US Congress will always be willing to go along with 
the US executive at the moment of maximum system 
fragility; that central bank communication networks 
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and the policy consensus upon which they are based 
will remain robust; and that the fiscal implications of 
coordinated liquidity and solvency operations will ever 
again be easy to obscure. 
In short, member states should let the FSB do its 
modest work with its modest staff but then accept the 
necessity of embedding that work deeply into a larger 
collaborative macroeconomic policy arrangement. 
This should not simply be acknowledged rhetorically 
or ritualistically during semi-annual International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) meetings, 
but directly in the continuing and routine work of the 
robust staff of a global institution committed to deep 
macroeconomic policy collaboration. My guess is that 
the high-water mark for making that institution the 
Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers’ 
central bank, occurred during the past decade. The 
crisis of 2008 reminded us how important coordinated 
central bank liquidity operations could be, but it 
also refocused attention on the murky borderlands 
between systemic liquidity and individual institutional 
solvency as well as between monetary actions and fiscal 
consequences. It underscored, in short, the difference 
between technical, operational independence and actual 
political independence. Central banks often have the 
former, but none have the latter. Balancing effectiveness 
and legitimacy is crucial if collaborative and reliable 
adjustments in sensitive macroeconomic policies are 
required to manage systemic risks. The coordinating 
institution must therefore be the one that fully engages 
the attention of heads of government, finance ministers 
and key legislators. That institution is the IMF. 
The construction of a bridge between prudential policy 
making and macroeconomic policy making at the system 
level began in 1999 with the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program of the Fund and the World Bank. The United 
States initially agreed to allow its own financial system 
to be scrutinized, the Bush administration reversed 
course, and in the wake of the crisis of 2008 that reversal 
was reversed. So now all G7 countries will go through 
the FSAP process every five years. In addition, the states 
represented in the FSB have agreed to undergo periodic 
peer reviews, using among other evidence FSAP 
reports prepared by the Fund and the Bank. If members 
follow through, this is all to the good. But surely the 
idea behind these less-than-binding procedures bears 
a family resemblance to the commitment already 
embodied in the IMF, namely mutual accountability for 
national contributions to systemic risk. The difference, 
of course, lies in the legal obligation underpinning Fund 
surveillance in both its national and multilateral settings, 
in the number of states involved, and in the nature of 
the preparatory staff work that would amount to more 
than just technical advice to a “process. ”But having 
already accepted such an obligation, one must ask, why 
shouldn’t all participants in integrating financial markets 
be expected actually to live up to it?
As long as we remain unwilling to move seriously 
away from the objective of global markets ― that is, 
as long as our governments at the very least remain 
unwilling to break up, control the linkages between and 
quite definitively regulate and supervise the national 
operations of the 30 private financial institutions 
identified by the FSB as potentially posing the most 
significant systemic financial risks– then surely we 
must have more ambitious political objectives. For 
some years now, international economists, economic 
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geographers and political scientists have tried to put 
an optimistic spin on the notion that “networked 
governance” can be appropriate for an integrating 
global economy. In the wake of the recent financial 
crisis, the term begins to sound like “no government, 
except the national one. ”I doubt that is adequate, 
especially in a world where the imperfect substitute 
for global government since 1945, the United States, 
may be increasingly reluctant to play that role. 
Rasminsky once said to me, “At the League, we were 
expected to catch fish, but we had no bait. ”We do not 
need to re-learn our history lessons the hard way. In 
the wake of the crisis of 2008, it is time for some serious 
fishing. We should not shy away from naming the big 
fish honestly. It is global government, including deep, 
binding, and well-staffed arrangements for cross-
national fiscal and monetary burden-sharing adequate 
to sustain integrating financial markets. If we really 
cannot imagine the bait that will help us catch it, then we 
should abandon the dream of global markets. And since 
the dream was originally dreamt in response to military 
insecurity, we must then not flinch at the consequent 
challenge of imagining feasible alternatives at this most 
basic level of world order. If we are not that brave, then 
it is far preferable to return seriously to the hard work of 
realizing the dream. We may then discover that Polak, 
Gold, and Rasminsky were just ahead of their time. 
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Issues to be faced by 
the FSB 
Andrew Baker1
Just over 12 months ago I wrote a short briefing note 
for Chatham House on the subject of the reform of the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the predecessor of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). In that note, I wrote 
that when the FSF was established ten years earlier it 
had been a spectacularly good idea because it brought 
macroeconomic policy makers together with financial 
regulators in one venue, creating the potential for multi 
actor/multi perspective dialogues. But I also argued 
that the FSF had largely failed to realize that potential. 
This was not a popular message. The largely private 
sector consensus in the room at a subsequent meeting 
was that the FSF had performed rather well and was 
an example of a well-functioning, successful institution 
unencumbered by that dirty word “bureaucracy. ” My 
relatively negative verdict on the FSF was, however, 
based on two things that remain relevant in the context of 
any informed discussion of the FSB. First, it was unclear 
precisely what it was the FSF had spent the previous ten 
years doing. Second, related to this, the FSF had not been 
1  I would like to thank Eric Helleiner for some 
comments on an earlier draft of this note, while 
acknowledging that the thoughts contained in it are my 
responsibility alone. 
given a clear mandate, and consequently its precise role, 
function and powers had been shrouded in ambiguity 
and confusion. 
The problem with making assertions about the 
institutional nature of the FSF/FSB is that they are 
largely based on anecdotal evidence. No systematic 
comprehensive studies of the FSF/FSB as an institution 
exist and most of us have only an anecdotal appreciation 
of what goes on behind closed doors at FSF meetings 
and the full range of institutional and social dynamics at 
work. In relation to the anecdotal nature of knowledge 
about the FSF/FSB, the two problems identified above 
came together in one of the few insiders’ observations 
on the FSF. The former head of the UK’s Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), Howard Davies, wrote that 
for most of its existence the FSF had been prevented by 
the United States from doing any work of its own, other 
than reporting on the work of other bodies (Davies and 
Green, 2008). In other words, the lack of a clear mandate 
for the FSF had led to institutional drift, thwarting the 
forum’s potential, with the US operating a power of veto 
over the institution, as in many other global economic 
governance settings. For a body that is supposed to play 
a pivotal role in contributing to “financial stability,” it is 
problematic to allow large countries to have a power of 
veto, especially when they have the capacity to generate 
huge destabilizing financial crises with enormous 
negative externalities for all sectors and countries. 
The recent crisis revealed that contemporary financial 
systems are inherently pro-cyclical. Mitigating pro-
cyclicality has become a major concern for the new FSB. Pro-
cyclicality, however, is not simply an economic, financial 
or market-based phenomenon. A financial boom is also 
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a psychological, intellectual and political construction, 
reflecting politicians’ incentives for booms to continue 
well after an election has been successfully contested. Any 
institution charged with mitigating pro-cyclicalty and 
leaning against the wind of the psychological, political and 
market dynamics of a boom will prove to be something 
of a nuisance to politicians. For a body like the FSB this 
makes the whole issue of mandates, accountability and 
decision making particularly pressing and delicate. These 
issues will be integral to the ability of the FSB to perform 
its function in the public interest. They are also very tricky 
questions. In what follows, I seek to tease out some of the 
issues concerning questions of mandate, accountability 
and internal decision making at the FSB. 
The Mandate Issue 
What tasks and function should the FSB perform and 
what form of institutional organization is required to 
best enable it to perform those functions? My current 
observations are that the FSB looks set to perform 
three principal tasks or functions. First, the FSB is now 
carrying out work of its own. At the behest of the G20 
leaders, finance ministers and central bank governors, 
the FSB prepares specialist reports on various themes as 
requested. The FSB is consequently acting as a permanent 
secretariat or working group whose priorities and agenda 
are set by the G20. Second, the FSB is the venue for a 
form of peer review borrowed from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s peer 
review process. Third, the FSB (and this last area is least 
clear) looks set to perform some sort of early warning 
function, identifying or sniffing out incipient financial 
booms or potential systemic financial difficulties. 
The first of these areas is relatively straight-forward, 
but given previous history it might be worth formally 
acknowledging that the FSB now has a knowledge 
generation function as directed by the G20, and is not 
simply a forum for dialogue and coordination between a 
range of other institutional actors. 
The second and third areas are far more complicated. In 
relation to peer review, the OECD’s peer review process and 
the Reports on the Observance of Standards Codes (ROSCs) 
conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank have in the past both allowed for the country 
under review to veto the publication of the eventual report. 
In this respect, there is a sense that the peer review exercises 
generally might be more about policy dialogue than the 
enforcement of specific standards. Some sort of explanation 
or signalling of the purpose of the peer review process in the 
mandate of the FSB might be helpful in this regard. 
It is also crucially important that the FSB remains focused 
on monitoring domestic progress towards meeting 
the new “macroprudential” priorities in areas such as 
”mitigating pro-cyclicality” and compensation practice 
reform so as to support financial stability, adequate capital 
provisioning and capital buffer requirements for banks, 
and functioning central counterparties (CCP) for OTC 
derivatives trading. What is unclear is how and whether 
the FSB will signal concerns about inadequate reform 
progress in these areas in specific member countries. 
Other questions include how critical judgments would 
be reached and crucially whether any mechanisms or 
safeguards will exist to prevent critical messages from 
being diluted, or removed, due to political pressure from 
a particular member state. How to protect the autonomy 
of the FSB’s critical voice, and its ability to publish critical 
findings in the context of the peer review exercise is an 
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issue that needs and deserves further attention. 
Finally, in relation to its third function, the FSB would 
also appear well placed to provide early warnings 
about incipient financial problems given its focus 
on macroeconomic and monetary data and financial 
regulatory questions. Other surveillance and early 
warning mechanisms already exist at other institutions 
and, as the FSB brings these institutions to the table at 
the same time, it might be a good place for comparing 
various analyses. Given their track record in diagnosing 
the current crisis long before other actors, and given 
their Basel location, it might make sense to mandate 
the FSB to structure their forecasting and surveillance 
discussions around the data and analysis of the Bank 
of International Settlements (BIS) research department. 
Much as G7 surveillance began with a presentation by 
the managing director of the IMF and the director of 
research at deputies meetings, FSB meetings might be 
led by an initial presentation and assessment by the BIS. 
The BIS is well placed to undertake this role in the 
FSB context, due to its access to central bank data and 
a well developed interest in the relationship between 
financial regulation, financial sector performance 
and developments, and macroeconomic policy and 
outlook. The relative lack of voice for the BIS research 
department in important institutional settings was 
exposed by the crisis, because its prescient analysis 
and warnings fell on largely deaf ears. Giving the BIS 
a specified institutional presence and voice in the FSB 
may be a way of overcoming this. The mandate of the 
FSB should make reference to its relationship with BIS 
staff, given their close proximity on a day-to-day basis, 
and the recent track record of the BIS in making the 
correct calls on financial stability issues. 
Note that the current mandate of the FSB as outlined at 
http://www. financialstabilityboard. org/about/mandate. 
htm remains vague and fails to get to grips with some of 
the institutional issues listed here and below. 
Accountability Issues 
Scholars in the field of international relations are often 
concerned about unaccountable and unresponsive 
technocrats operating in exclusive networks. The issue 
is potentially far more complex in the case of the FSB. 
It is now established that the FSB is accountable and 
answerable to G20 leaders, who in turn set priorities, 
agendas and ask the FSB to conduct certain work. But 
the FSB’s role is to provide unpalatable messages, to lean 
against the wind, to highlight shortcomings in regulatory 
reform, and to voice concerns about unsustainable 
financial booms and the build up of dangerous sets of 
conditions. Or at least it should be. 
Performing the role of “Cassandra” in this way will 
not always be compatible with the political business 
cycles in systemically important G20 countries. If the 
FSB writes bad news reports, or produces findings that 
G20 politicians do not want to hear, and if peer review 
turns up potential problems in domestic practice, and 
if the FSB warns about the build-up of a systemically 
dangerous sets of financial conditions, G20 politicians 
may face incentives to muffle and silence those messages. 
For a body concerned with catalyzing and encouraging 
counter-cyclicality, it is important that it has some 
autonomy, or protection from political pressure and 
control. In other words, the accountability relationship 
between the FSB and the G20 needs to be handled 
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
22 Part I: Authority and Governance cigionline.org
sensitively and flow both ways. That accountability 
relationship needs to be specified in such a way that, 
while the G20 can set priorities and agendas for the FSB, 
neither the G20 nor any of its members should be able 
to silence or stifle FSB findings. The G20 should have 
an obligation to publicise FSB findings, regardless of 
whether their content might be potentially politically 
unpalatable for G20 powers. 
FSB Decision Making 
The informal, networked exchanges, which the FSB 
is supposed to facilitate, mean that the least politically 
contentious and most attractive mode of operation is to 
plump for consensual decision making. But given the 
counter-cyclical function of the FSB, consensual decision 
making is also potentially problematic and riddled with 
tensions. The problem with decision making based on 
consensus is that it effectively hands a right of veto to any 
member state. In some settings, this mode of operation 
makes sense and the consensus of every member is 
vital. But in the case of the FSB, if it is to perform its 
countercyclical role properly, it will be very difficult to 
avoid politically unpopular messages. 
In this respect, the FSB needs to decide, given the nature 
of its tasks, whether one member state could object and 
veto the overall majority position. Consensus is desirable 
and is the route of least political resistance, but it may 
dilute and undermine the FSB’s capacity to perform 
its proper function. In this sense, not all FSB states are 
equal, both in terms of representation or status. Veto will 
be easier for some than others. The FSB should consider 
whether a critical number of oppositional states is a 
requirement for a veto to hold over a particular finding, 
or message, and where the bar should be set in this 
regard. A failure to consider this issue carefully could 
result in the FSB being stifled and muzzled by a single 
powerful state, as its predecessor was in the recent past. 
If that were to happen, the FSB, like the FSF, would fail 
to realize its potential. 
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The history of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), 
although it has made some improvements in seeking 
a more important participation of the less developed 
countries, still shows some gaps in terms of broadening 
that representation to the rest of the countries that are 
still not members, and in terms of setting a deeper and 
more diverse agenda of the issues to be discussed. 
Also, the Board’s lack of resources to guarantee a balanced 
and symmetrical enforcement on the different countries 
puts on the table the delicate balance existing between 
the respect to sovereignty of each of the countries and 
the need that all nations, beyond their sizes, comply with 
certain rules in a globalized world. 
Background 
The origin of the Financial Stability Board can be found 
in its predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 
created by the G7 members in 1999, and at that moment, 
formed by Germany, Canada, United States, France, 
Italy, Japan and United Kingdom. 
The purpose of that forum was to provide an international 
discussion forum to increase the levels of cooperation 
among the different financial institutions and the 
supervisory agencies, both at national and international 
level, with the ultimate goal of guaranteeing global 
financial system stability. 
The FSF gathered national authorities responsible for 
the financial stability (ministries of economy, central 
banks and securities regulators) of the most important 
financial centres, certain specific groups of international 
institutions, regulators and supervisors (International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF),Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World 
Bank (WB), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS)), and so forth), and expert committees (from the 
central banks) specialized in the markets’ operations and 
infrastructure. 
The crisis that began in 2007 and was caused in the central 
countries ended up affecting the whole world, forcing 
the broadening of the representation mechanisms in the 
organization. 
FSB Make-Up and Operation 
In November 2008 the G20 members called for an increase 
in the number of countries that were participating in 
the forum. In this way, the FSB’s new structure tries to 
represent in a more reliable way the interests of a broader 
group of nations, and certain countries that had not 
participated in the predecessor, the FSF, were included 
in the new organization. 
Currently the forum is composed as follows: the 
aforementioned G7 countries, the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), Argentina, Australia, 
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Hong Kong, Indonesia, Mexico, Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Spain, South Korea, South Africa, 
Switzerland and Turkey. 
The FSB’s organization includes a chairman, a steering 
committee, a secretariat and a plenary that includes 
representatives of the member countries, standards 
setting groups and the international financial institutions. 
The plenary meeting is the body in charge of adopting 
decisions, by consensus. The number of seats assigned 
to each member jurisdiction reflects: a) the size of 
the economy, b) the activity of the financial market; 
and c) national financial stability arrangements (level 
of adherence to international standards and codes, 
participation in the international evaluation programs 
and the level of disclosure given to them), resulting in 
the following distribution: countries with one seat in the 
plenary are Argentina, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa and Turkey; countries 
with two seats in the plenary are Australia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, South Korea, Spain and Switzerland; 
countries with three seats in the plenary are Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, Canada,France, Germany,Italy, 
Japan, United Kingdom and United States. 
In the case of those countries with only one seat, the 
representation is performed by the national monetary 
authority. In the case of those countries that have two 
jurisdictional authorities as members, the seats are 
occupied by the monetary authority and a treasury’s 
representative. Finally, in the case of those countries 
that have three seats in the plenary, a representative of 
the local securities regulator is added to the monetary 
authority’s and the treasury’s representatives. 
Completing this list of plenary members, the FSB also 
includes the European Central Bank, the European 
Commission, the standards setters’ representatives, 
and the international financial institutions (IFIs), as 
follows: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
World Bank, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS), Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB), International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
Additionally, the plenary has the possibility of creating 
standing committees and working groups with the 
purpose of assisting the organization to carry out 
its missions. Currently, the FSB has three standing 
committees (the Standing Committee on Assessment of 
Vulnerabilities, the Standing Committee for Supervisory 
and Regulatory Cooperation, and the Standing 
Committee for Standards Implementation) and three 
ad hoc working groups (the Cross-border Crisis 
Management Working Group, the Expert Group on 
Non-cooperative Jurisdictions, and the Working Group 
on Compensation). 
The members of the different committees are appointed 
by the plenary meeting, with the chairman’s prior 
recommendation. The chairman is elected by the plenary 
for a three-year term, and can be re-elected only once. 
The regulations currently set forth that the decisions are 
taken by the plenary’s consensus. However, there are no 
definitions about the decision mechanisms in those cases 
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where there is no consensus. 
Governance – Critical View
The discussion about the governance of the IFIs, and 
particularly the recently created FSB is very broad, but 
I would like to point out two issues: the scope of the 
representation that the FSB has today, and the depth and 
relevance of the subject matters that have been discussed. 
In terms of the countries’ participation, we can say 
that the launch of the FSB has brought an important 
improvement in the representation that the 
organization has, comprising 70 percent of the world 
population and 90 percent of its GDP (the G8 included 
14 percent of the world population and 65 percentof 
the GDP). This broader representation still does not 
include all the countries. 
Although some point out that the “technocracy” that 
is part of the FSB is composed of the same actors that 
did not foresee the crisis, others hold the particular 
interests of the principal governments that are part 
of the G20 as responsible for not moving the agenda 
forward in the way this moment requires. The recent 
postponement of the discussion within the European 
Union about hedge funds regulations, a consequence of 
the opposing interests between the governments of the 
United Kingdom and the United States on one side, and 
the governments of France and Germany on the other 
side, is a good example of this problem. 
It is also worth pointing out Eric Helleiner’s and 
Tony Porter´s (2009) opinion on the accountability 
of the transnational networks of financial regulators. 
They identify three different accountability problems 
associated with these networks: (i) those related to 
the uneven representation of the countries, (ii) those 
relating to their technocratic character, and (iii) those 
related to the risk of capture of the regulator by the 
financial industry. 
Some voices, such as Stiglitz (2004) and Eichengreen 
(2008), argue that part of the problem is that a partial 
representation is a less than optimal status, and that the 
governance of global finance should advance towards a 
WTO-style model, where the member countries actively 
participate in taking decisions in an organization that 
has enforcement mechanisms which ensure effective 
compliance with the adopted resolutions. 
With reference to this, Stiglitz (2004) refers to the IFIs 
– that, as we said, are part of the FSB – as incapable of 
regulating the decisive failures of the market, stating that 
they keep themselves as opaque and poorly democratic 
organizations. At the same time, economists such as 
Eatwell and Taylor (2006) have been asking for years 
for the creation of a world authority that regulates the 
financial system in a global way. 
Obviously, this discussion involves the level of 
sovereignty that the countries are willing to give up, 
since, although the broadening of representation is good 
news, it seems there are not many changes in the agenda 
that are being discussed internationally in terms of 
financial stability. In this respect, it would be necessary 
to complement the implementation of the national legal 
systems and the cooperation agreements, in order to 
reconcile the delicate matter of the sovereignty of the 
countries with effective international regulation, which 
implies raising the minimum regulatory standards of 
each country in a uniform manner. 
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In this regard, there are some issues related to the rules 
of the game of the international monetary order about 
which the FSB has not moved forward yet, and those are 
very important issues for worldwide financial stability 
in particular, and for the underdeveloped countries. 
In this sense, the FSB replicates the same deficiencies 
that other international entities show that focus on 
subject matter relevant for the developed economies, 
putting aside or including only partially matters such 
as global imbalances, the monetary and exchange 
regimes, capital controls, the US dollar’s international 
role, and the existence of a lender of last resort. The 
key role of the state in financial regulation is an issue 
that the G20 has not raised yet in a sufficiently strong 
manner; despite the recent crisis, some still believe in 
self-regulation as the answer to the asymmetries or the 
regulatory gaps,. In this way, the FSB should respond 
to a clearer mandate given by the G20, aimed to 
obtain a comprehensive, consistent and stricter public 
regulation for agent/brokers, markets and products. 
Another qualitative issue referring to members’ 
representation is the balance existing among the 
treasuries, the central banks and the securities 
regulators. The recent international crisis brought about 
the necessity of regulating in a comprehensive way 
the different actors that participate in each financial 
system (banks, securities, insurance, and others). This 
should make us rethink whether the current actors that 
represent each of the countries include the subjects that 
are sought to be analyzed, or whether it is necessary to 
include new participants. 
These are fundamental issues that should be thoroughly 
discussed in order to make sure that the broader 
democratization of the international organizations’ 
governance proposed at the meetings held by the G20 
is finally reflected in facts. As an example of this, we can 
mention, among others, the pending job to be done by the 
countries about the regulation of offshore jurisdictions. 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to increase the 
number of countries involved in the discussions. The 
underdeveloped countries should work jointly in a 
shared agenda that reflects their common problems. 
The strategic purpose should be to achieve a new 
balanced content of the international financial 
institutions’ agenda, leading to the search for solutions 
to the above-mentioned problems. 
Conclusions 
Although the crisis has caused focus on the coordinated 
search for policies that ensure economic recovery, it 
has also shown the necessity of advancing towards 
more democratic and representative international 
governance systems. 
As Stiglitz points out, international financial stability 
should be considered as a worldwide public interest, 
and therefore its positive characteristics are desirable 
and should be equally distributed among all the nations, 
raising the minimum regulatory standards of each 
country in a uniform way in all the countries. 
The level of international cooperation and coordination 
that this requires meets strong resistance on the side of 
the international financial lobby that finds a threat to its 
status quo originated in the consolidation of more than 
three decades of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology. 
In the face of not only financial, but also political, 
Part I: Authority and Governance cigionline.org 27
The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance?
economic and social consequences caused by the last 
crisis, there are some attempts to reform the international 
financial architecture, but those are cosmetic and are 
based on the same rules that led to the debacle of the 
financial system. 
Consequently, the emerging countries should insist 
on their claims for greater participation in the IFIs’ 
governance, so as to achieve a change of the paradigm 
that will allow for a recovery of the original spirit of 
Bretton Woods, that considered that an international 
financial system was at the service of the balanced 
development of trade, production and employment. 
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Governance Issues 




The Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s basic structure and 
mandate builds directly on that of its predecessor, the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an institution that failed to 
live up to the hopes of many of its founders. Will the FSB 
meet the same fate in its efforts to strengthen international 
prudential standards? Three features of the FSB will help 
it overcome some of the weakness of the FSF, but each 
raises governance issues that need to be addressed. 
Membership and Legitimacy 
The larger membership of the FSB should help it to 
address some of the legitimacy issues that the FSF faced. 
When the FSF was created in 1999, it was assigned 
the task of coordinating and promoting worldwide a 
variety of international prudential financial standards. 
But its narrow country membership undermined its 
legitimacy – and thus its effectiveness. Developing 
countries, whose domestic financial regulation and 
supervision the FSF sought to improve, were excluded 
from the organization. They also had limited or no 
influence in many of the bodies that had developed the 
standards that the FSF was promoting. 
2  For more details on the issues raised here, see 
Helleiner (2010). 
This legitimacy problem has been partially addressed 
by widening the membership of the FSB (and of 
many of the standard-setting bodies) and by the new 
accountability of the FSB to the G20 leaders. But the 
inclusion of new countries at the decision making table 
needs to be followed by measures that allow these 
countries to make their voices count within the FSB. The 
organization’s committees and working groups might 
consider following the model of the G20 working groups 
that involve co-chairs from developed and developing 
countries. Developing country governments might 
also benefit from the provision of greater technical and 
research support, perhaps via a body controlled by the 
developing countries such as the G24. 
Because many new members bring distinctive 
perspectives to international regulatory discussions, 
their commitment to the FSB would likely be 
strengthened by more emphasis being placed on core 
principles in international standard-standing rather than 
detailed harmonized rules. This approach would leave 
more policy space for national authorities to interpret 
standards according to local conditions and preferences. 
Even with its larger size, the FSB still needs to confront 
the fact that its country membership remains very 
narrow in comparison to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank or World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Because the FSB has the ambition of promoting 
worldwide compliance with the standards that it 
endorses, its legitimacy vis-à-vis non-members may 
become politicized quickly. 
Under the FSB’s Charter, non-member countries may be 
consulted and may be included, on an ad hoc basis, in 
its working groups, standing committees and plenary 
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meetings. At a minimum, the FSB should formalize its 
willingness to consult with non-member countries by 
promising to request comments from non-members on 
any issue discussed by the plenary. 
The more thorough-going solution to the FSB’s 
legitimacy problem, however, would be to expand 
its membership further. The FSB’s Charter allows the 
plenary to expand the membership, as long as new 
countries accept certain commitments. A considerable 
expansion need not result in the FSB becoming 
an enormous and unwieldy body. It could have a 
strong executive body, building on the FSB’s steering 
committee, that could involve regional representation 
or IMF-style constituency systems. 
Governance Issues Relating to 
Compliance Mechanisms 
The FSB has also been assigned four new mechanisms to 
encourage compliance with international standards that 
were not available to the FSF. Each mechanism could be 
improved further. 
To begin with, FSB members have agreed to undergo an 
assessment under the IMF and World’s Bank Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) every five years, 
and to publicize the detailed IMF/WB assessments 
used as a basis for the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Because FSAPs and 
ROSCs had been voluntary before the FSB’s creation, 
this change is significant. Now that FSAPs and ROSCs 
have been assigned a more prominent role in the 
compliance process, however, the IMF and World 
Bank need to coordinate these programs more closely 
with the FSB’s objectives. 
Second, unlike the FSF, the FSB imposes an obligation 
on members to implement 12 core international financial 
standards as well as new standards that the FSB might 
itself create. The significance of this provision remains 
unclear, however, because of the lack of clarity about 
the consequences of non-compliance by a member 
and the processes that might generate a judgment of 
non-compliance. If this membership obligation is to be 
significant, this ambiguity needs to be cleared up. 
Third, FSB members have committed to undergo peer 
reviews that are both country and theme-based. The 
new peer review process is potentially important, 
but successful international peer review processes 
elsewhere have been supported by a strong international 
secretariat. The FSB’s tiny staff is unlikely to be able to 
provide this kind of support. The effectiveness of the 
FSB peer review mechanism would also be strengthened 
if the countries conducting the reviews were at similar 
levels of financial market development and regulation 
as those they were reviewing. 
Finally, FSB members have decided to be more active 
than the FSF ever was in encouraging compliance among 
all countries and jurisdictions not complying with core 
international prudential standards. The achievement of 
this goal may be complicated not just by the legitimacy 
issues noted above but also by reliance onthe FSB plenary 
as the ultimate judge of non-compliance. Consensus in 
that forum may not always be easy to reach. 
The Governance of 
Macroprudential Regulation 
The final area on which the FSB looks set to improve 
over the FSF’s experience has to do with efforts to 
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address macroprudential concerns about systemic risks. 
In the decade preceding the current crisis, international 
standards focused too narrowly on microprudential 
issues concerned with the stability of individual 
institutions, products and markets. It is encouraging that 
the G20 have mandated the FSB to tackle macroprudential 
issues much more directly, but the latter’s capacity to do 
so may be undermined by two governance issues. 
First, the FSB’s relationship with the other principal 
international standard-setting bodies remains 
ambiguous. The FSB has been empowered to conduct 
“joint strategic reviews of the policy development 
work of the international standard setting bodies” and 
“promote and help coordinate the alignment of the 
activities of the SSBs. ” The standard setting bodies 
are also now required to report to the FSB on their 
work in order to provide “a broader accountability 
framework” for their activities. However, the FSB 
Charter notes that “this process should not undermine 
the independence of the standard setting process. ” 
The last line creates considerable ambiguity about this 
aspect of the FSB’s mandate. 
Because of their cross-cutting nature, some parts of 
the macroprudential regulatory agenda require close 
coordination with the activities of standard setting 
bodies. If the FSB cannot play an effective coordinating 
role, the international macroprudential agenda will 
be weakened. The resistance of bodies such as the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to 
some elements of this agenda has already revealed the 
limits of the FSB’s influence. 
Second, to implement effective macroprudential 
regulation, the risk of the “capture” of the regulatory 
process by private actors needs to be addressed more 
squarely. Macroprudential regulation requires regulators 
to take a strong stance against market trends, such as 
cyclical booms or growing concentration and risk-taking 
within the financial system. If regulators’ relationships 
with private market actors are too cosy, this role cannot 
be performed well. 
Specific international regulations that might help 
to address the capture issue include initiatives that 
would reduce complexity and opacity (for example, 
simple leverage rules, or forcing credit derivatives 
onto exchanges). The peer review process may also 
help to counteract private lobbying by bolstering the 
independence of national authorities. But the FSB could 
also address the private capture issue more directly. It 
could, for example, develop standards for regulators 
that minimize the problem of “revolving doors” by 
outlining mandatory public disclosure on the websites 
of regulatory bodies of all past and present industry ties 
of individuals on those bodies, and/or rules specifying a 
minimum number of years before regulators can shift to 
private-sector lobbying and vice versa. 
The FSB could also develop procedures to address 
the role of private sector influence within its own 
deliberations. The FSB’s Charter states that, when 
developing its medium- and long-term goals, the FSB 
“will consult widely amongst its Members and with 
other stakeholders including private sector and non-
member authorities. ” By restricting its choice of societal 
actors to the “private sector,” the FSB leaves itself open 
to the charge that private financial interests could have 
privileged access. This impression is reinforced by 
another part of the Charter which states: “In the context 
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of specific sessions of the plenary, the Chair can also 
invite, after consultation with Members, representatives 
of the private sector. ” 
If private sector actors are being invited to contribute to 
the FSB’s activities in these ways, active efforts should be 
made to counter-balance their influence by encouraging 
participation from other civil societygroups as well. 
Transnational groupings of legislators and non-financial 
officials could also play a counter-balancing role. In 
addition to being consulted, these policy makers could 
be encouraged to monitor its work, as could an arms-
length body similar to that of the Independent Evaluation 
Office of the IMF. Peer review processes could also invite 
input from wider official circles. 
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This memo argues that we should answer the question 
in the title by reviewing the recent past record of policy 
surveillance. This record is marked by failure to achieve 
the objectives of promoting system stability through policy 
coordination and compliance with international standards. 
In the past, effective surveillance was weakest where it 
mattered most: in identifying international standards that 
would effectively promote stability, and in coordinating 
and constraining the policy choices of the major countries. 
In what follows, I focus on the latter issue rather than that 
of how to set appropriate international standards. Effective 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) surveillance would need to 
overcome these basic weaknesses, but there are few reasons 
to believe that the political constraints and incentives have 
changed sufficiently to achieve this. Effective surveillance 
is likely to remain a work in progress and an aggressive 
stance on enforcement is unlikely to be workable. 
The History of International 
Surveillance 
Economic policy surveillance has, since 1945, been the 
primary responsibility of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and has been relatively narrowly confined to the 
external consequences of national macroeconomic policy 
choices. From the early 1960s, the G10 and later the G5/7 
usurped some of this authority, to the detriment of IMF policy 
surveillance. Neither form of surveillance was effective in 
coordinating macroeconomic policy choices and in preventing 
the emergence of large and persistent payments imbalances. 
Macroeconomic policy choices were largely shaped instead 
by domestic economic and political forces. 
In the early 1990s the focus of international surveillance 
began to shift with the decision to monitor compliance with 
a series of international financial standards. The first of these 
was the Financial Action Task Force of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, which 
reviewed and promoted compliance (in part by naming, 
shaming and sanctioning) with its anti-money laundering 
standard. After the Mexican and Asian financial crises, 
the G7 assigned to the IMF and World Bank the tasks of 
surveillance and promotion of compliance with a much 
larger number of “best practice” international standards on 
macroeconomic policy and data transparency, institutional 
and market infrastructure, and financial regulation and 
supervision. In all cases, relevant international standards 
were set by institutions dominated by the major developed 
countries (though in some cases the standard-setters were 
quasi-private organizations). The same was true, of course, 
of the international institutions monitoring and promoting 
compliance with these standards, primarily through 
the joint IMF-World Bank Financial System Assessment 
Program (FSAP) and related technical assistance. Reports 
on Standards and Codes (ROSCs) were intended to promote 
compliance through external assessment and transparency. 
The record of international financial institution (IFI) 
promotion of convergence on international financial 
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standards was very mixed. As the Table 1 shows, there are 
conspicuous gaps in the FSAP/ROSC assessment process 
(the table only shows FSAPs and ROSCs for G20 countries 
in the area of financial regulation, on which the FSB intends 
to concentrate). Some countries undertook IFI reviews but 
did not publish the reports (for example, Brazil and India); 
in about a quarter of all cases, the national authorities chose 
to suppress ROSC publication. Even more preferred to 
excise sensitive parts of published reports, including most 
quantitative assessments of compliance with international 
standards. ROSCs were also very infrequent and thus often 
outdated. The IFIs were sensitive to their relationships with 
national authorities, and published reports were often 
not very frank about the sometimes high levels of “mock 
compliance” with international standards— where there are 
large and often hidden gaps between the formal adoption of 
international standards and real compliance (Walter, 2008). 
The Japanese FSAP/ROSCs of 2003 were a conspicuous 
G20 ROSC/FSAP modules published












date date date date
Argentina 1 15/04/1999 1 33%
Australia 1 23/10/2006 1 23/10/2006 1 23/10/2006 1 23/10/2006 3 100%
Brazil 01/01/2002 ? ? ? 0 0%
Canada 01/01/2000 1 30/06/2000 1 30/06/2000 1 30/06/2000 3 100%
China 0 0% agreed to 
FSAP 2008
France 1 23/11/2004 1 23/11/2004 1 23/11/2004 1 23/11/2004 3 100%
Germany 1 06/11/2003 1 06/11/2003 1 06/11/2003 1 06/11/2003 3 100%
India 01/01/2000 ? ? 0 0%
Indonesia 0 0%
Italy 1 14/03/2006 1 14/03/2006 1 14/03/2006 1 14/03/2006 3 100%
Japan 1 05/09/2003 1 05/09/2003 1 05/09/2003 1 05/09/2003 3 100%
Republic of Korea 1 19/03/2003 1 19/03/2003 1 19/03/2003 1 19/03/2003 3 100%
Mexico 1 25/10/2001 1 25/10/2001 1 25/10/2001 1 25/10/2001 3 100%
Russian Federation 1 30/05/2003 1 30/05/2003 1 30/05/2003 1 30/05/2003 3 100%
Saudi Arabia 1 05/06/2006 1 05/06/2006 1 33%
South Africa 01/01/2000 ? ? 1 22/10/2000 1 33%
Turkey 0 0%
United Kingdom 1 03/03/2003 1 03/03/2003 1 03/03/2003 1 03/03/2003 3 100%




53% 63% 58% 58%
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
34 Part II: Surveillance, Peer Review and International Standards cigionline.org
exception to this generalization: there was considerable 
criticism of Japanese compliance failures in these reports, 
which may have deterred participation by other Asian 
countries. Some important G20 countries, including 
Argentina, China, Indonesia, Turkey and the US, simply 
chose not to participate at all. 
The particular stance of the US significantly inhibited the 
deepening of the surveillance norm since 1945. The US 
has had an exceptionalist attitude towards international 
macroeconomic surveillance, seeing it mainly as a source of 
constraint on countries other than itself. The same was true 
of the FSAP process on financial regulation, in which the US 
refused (until 2008) to participate itself, even while urging 
the major emerging countries to submit to such review. The 
US domestic political process has also been a substantial 
constraint on America’s ability to converge upon international 
standards as the tortured path to implementation of Basel II 
demonstrated (Foot and Walter, forthcoming). 
In short, for a variety of reasons it is small wonder that IMF 
surveys of market participant attitudes towards ROSC 
reports suggested both poor knowledge and substantial 
levels of disinterest (FSF, 2001: 29-32). Private firms 
sometimes complained that the IFIs needed to do “naming 
and shaming,” but the IFIs were reluctant and national 
authorities often prevented it (IEO, 2006: 41). Compulsory 
participation in the FSAP and publication of ROSCs was 
sometimes mooted but proved politically unworkable. The 
basic problem with past surveillance, in both the areas of 
macroeconomic policy and financial regulation, is that it was 
weakest where it mattered most. This applied particularly 
to the major developed countries, where the demand for 
policy autonomy has been strong and where the leverage 
of intergovernmental organizations has been weak. “Peer 
surveillance” in groups like the G7 in practice increasingly 
amounted to an implicit cease-fire agreement to avoid 
sensitive policy issues. It is also worth noting that as regards 
compliance with core international financial standards, the 
IMF’s own researchers have found no relationship between 
country compliance and banking sector risk (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2010). 
Will FSB Surveillance be Different?
The FSB’s new surveillance strategy was outlined after 
the London G20 leaders’ summit. The initial focus 
was on adherence to international cooperation and 
information exchange standards to prevent gaps in the 
global regulatory and supervisory framework. But it is 
far from evident why we should expect the FSB to be 
more independent and robust in its surveillance than 
were the IMF and World Bank, or why peer surveillance 
within the FSB or G20 should overcome the problems 
associated with the G7. 
In September 2009 the FSB said it would establish 
“criteria for identifying jurisdictions of concern by 
November 2009” (FSB, 2009: 12). Given the obvious 
systemic importance of the US and UK and, especially 
in the former case, the strong likelihood of domestic 
politics-driven delays in regulatory reform, a possible 
litmus test of the FSB’s credibility as regards effective 
surveillance might be whether one or both of these 
two major jurisdictions are subject to (confidential) FSB 
dialogue over the remainder of 2010 – and whether such 
dialogue has any measurable effect on policy outcomes. 
We have yet to see the results of the long-promised 
US Financial System Stability Assessment, but to be 
credible it will need to conduct a robust assessment of 
(among other things) the weaknesses of the US financial 
Part II: Surveillance, Peer Review and International Standards cigionline.org 35
The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance?
supervisory architecture, delays in implementation of 
Basel II, divergences between US and IASB accounting 
standards, and the considerable uncertainties of post-
crisis regulatory reforms. Furthermore, if the FSB 
designates US adherence to international standards in 
most areas as “compliant” or “largely compliant” (the 
top two categories), as seems likely, will this do much 
to prevent future large crises? The FSB has stated that its 
peer surveillance will rely heavily on FSAP assessments 
of G20 countries (FSB, 2010: 1-2), but ROSCs have been 
an ineffective tool for promoting compliance in the past; 
nor did they prevent the build-up of financial fragility in 
the major centres before 2008. 
Emerging markets and offshore financial centres 
(OFCs) have, since the 1990s, been the main targets of 
financial sector surveillance. They would be justified 
in demanding that this asymmetry should be reversed, 
given that the key regulatory failures that contributed 
to the 2008-2009 crisis occurred in the most advanced 
countries. Is the FSB’s new commitment to symmetry 
in international surveillance and enforcement credible, 
given that the major developed countries will remain in 
a strong position to resist external pressure for policy 
convergence? Chinese officials, for example, are openly 
sceptical that countries such as the UK took much notice 
of the content of ROSC reports or any recommendations 
that followed the related peer discussion (Foot and Walter, 
forthcoming). More importantly, the strong aversion 
in emerging countries such as China to international 
surveillance that involves targeted naming and shaming 
is clear from the historical record. China has been 
more relaxed about convergence towards international 
financial standards than about macroeconomic policy 
surveillance, but its basic view is that countries should 
be free to choose their own pace and style of reform. 
Given the demonstrated failures of past international 
standard-setting and surveillance, China is unlikely to 
be alone in this view among major emerging countries 
in the G20. The failure of international surveillance to 
promote financial stability in the major countries was 
costly for China and other new entrants to the inner circle 
of global economic governance, but they – like the major 
developed countries – are likely to prefer the retention 
of a soft version of international surveillance in practice. 
Works Cited 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Enrica Detragiache (2010). 
“Basel Core Principles and Bank Risk: Does Compliance 
Matter?” IMF Working Papers, no. 10/81. March. 
Foot, Rosemary, and Andrew Walter (forthcoming). 
China, the United States, and International Order. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2010). “FSB Framework 
for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards. 
”January 9. 
____ (2009). “Improving Financial Regulation: Report of the 
Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders. ” September 25. 
____ (2001). Final Report of the Follow-Up Group on Incentives 
to Foster Implementation of Standards. Basle. August 21. 
Independent Evaluation Office, IMF (IEO) (2006). Report 
on the Evaluation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program. 
Washington, D. C. : IMF. January. 
Walter, Andrew (2008). Governing Finance: East Asia’s 
Adoption of International Standards. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
36 Part II: Surveillance, Peer Review and International Standards cigionline.org






The G20 has given the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) the 
tremendous task of promoting global financial stability 
and preventing a repeat of the errors preceding the 
international financial crisis. To further coordinate the 
complex layers of the global financial, and monetary 
system, the G20 revamped the FSB, a small and once-
obscure forum located in Basel. Then, with the re-
energized and added funding of the IMF located in 
Washington, these two organizations are to realize a new 
and better coordinated international financial system. 
While the efforts of the G20 initiatives are commendable 
and a step forward in the realization toward enhanced 
coordination, there are limits to what these two 
organizations can achieve. 
One of the glaring challenges to coordinating IMF and 
FSB work is organizational. In addition to the logistical 
challenges of coordinating two organizations separated 
by an ocean, the IMF with more than 2,000 staff remains 
a mammoth compared to the dozen or so staff currently 
at the FSB. The IMF is a universal institution that has 
undergone a great transformation toward transparency; 
the FSB is a selective institution of G20 members that 
remains unknown. The technocratic work of IMF staff is 
subject to review of the politicized Executive Board; the 
FSB has no clear hierarchy but reports to the G20 leaders. 
Putting these organizational challenges aside, this memo 
seeks to highlight a greater challenge: old-fashioned 
politics. Like other political-economy scholars, I raise the 
unaddressed issue of external political interference and 
the domestic incentives to shirk responsibilities. 
On the matter of improving coordination of surveillance, 
the G7 had already developed a series of international 
financial standards that were designed to avert a repeat 
of crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. Specifically, the 
G7 asked the IMF (with the assistance of the World 
Bank) to monitor country compliance with the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes. Many countries, 
however, insisted that the process be voluntary which 
ultimately made the exercise futile as global economic 
heavyweights like the United States delayed or refused 
to commit to an FSAP– an obvious problem in light of 
the fact that the US financial system was the epicentre 
of the last international financial crisis. Those that did 
commit to IMF oversight were often under the political 
thumb of the institution by needing access to financing 
or had little to lose or gain in their disclosures. It has been 
noted that the failures of these international financial 
standards lay in the fact that disclosure was voluntary 
for some and that many emerging market economies 
had no ownership in the standards, as they had not been 
part of the decision-making process. The hope of an 
expanded G20 is that the new members of the club will 
add legitimacy to the process and have a greater stake 
in mutual coordination. The G20 has also made both the 
ROSCs and FSAP mandatory and subject to disclosure; 
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but I have doubts that members will continue to abide 
by these commitments as international and domestic 
politics get in the way. 
The G20 envisions IMF and FSB coordination 
on monitoring of member countries’ compliance 
with international financial standards and on 
standardizing regulatory standards in banking and 
other financial services. The IMF will be, in the words 
of its managing director, the monitor of the “basic 
plumbing through which global capital flows;” the 
FSB will be the coordinator of information on what 
national regulators are allowing through the drain. 
The idea, then, is to use moral suasion of a G20 mutual 
assessment process where countries are essentially 
encouraged or shamed into providing full disclosure 
of nationally sensitive information, all in the interest 
of maintaining global financial stability. While this is 
a step forward, the author cautions that it will not be 
long before the G20 honeymoon ends and the skirting 
of responsibilities returns to the fore. The core of the 
problem lies in the potential for country free-riding: 
countries will each paddle less of their share in the 
row toward financial stability. Herein is the problem 
of voluntary disclosures of national authorities to 
international bodies: there are political and market 
incentives to domestic and international constituents 
to appear as stable as possible. The crisis in Greece 
today underscores these problems and has greatly 
affected the European Union and the eurozone. 
International economic coordination will always face 
the reality that national officials and markets will act 
in their own interest and first meet the needs of their 
constituents and stakeholders above all else. 
In addition to not clarifying how the two organizations 
will deal with the intractable problem of self-censure of 
members, it could be imagined that soon the G20 will 
lose its honeymoon bliss and enter the ho-hums of an 
international marriage. One can imagine the potential for 
historical sensitivities in having members preached to by 
rivals, and then envision the potential for self-censure. 
Can the US come to the G20 table and reprimand China 
or Russia? Japan, of China or Korea? Germany, of Turkey? 
United Kingdom, of Argentina? And so on. What is the 
likelihood that the G20 will devolve into a forum more 
like the UN Security Council, rampant with historical 
grudges? One cannot help but look at the IMF Executive 
Board to see how international political stakes are played 
out in a seemingly technocratic organization to know 
that there are risks of having the G20 slip into becoming 
another dysfunctional international body. This is further 
complicated by the problem of sending G20 political 
leaders, as opposed to economic ones, to the table. 
In some respects, the G20 is entrusting the IMF and FSB 
not only to coordinate information sharing and provide 
oversight, but also to provide the technocratic weight 
of their staffs to keep national and market interests in 
check. The reality, however, is that neither organization 
will be immune from external politicking, particularly 
when powerful members intervene to challenge IMF 
and FSB analyses. Moreover, imagine the uproar of 
legislatures, unions, banking, or business interests at 
the mention of regulatory changes at the national level 
coming from the advice of either the FSB or the IMF, or 
from the diktat of the G20 and its powerful members. 
Can national regulators return from G20 working 
groups and implement policy? Chances are more likely 
that they will all face uphill battles with legislatures and 
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bureaucracies. One would be remiss to not point out 
that the Basel II accords have yet to be implemented by 
the United States. Moreover, will the private bankers in 
Buenos Aires, Toronto, New York or London accept a 
supranational voice, or will they use their political and 
financial muscle at home to sway legislators? 
Ultimately, neither the IMF nor the FSB have the 
power to challenge a country’s sovereignty. Both these 
organizations, and their regulatory interlocutors, will 
remain dependent on moral suasion. Despite the efforts 
of the G20, both the IMF and FSB will be hampered by the 
political realities of countries wanting to preserve their 
national interests and politicians wanting to preserve 
their domestic support base. Effective international 
economic and financial policies may not work or sell in a 
politicized world of states. But it sure is worth a try. 
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Making the FSB Peer 
Review Effective 
Tony Porter
The adoption of transnational peer review is one of 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s most important 
potential improvements relative to its predecessor, the 
Financial Stability Forum. Article 5(1)(d) of the new FSB 
Charter requires members to “undergo periodic peer 
reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank 
public Financial Sector Assessment Program reports. 
” This implies that FSB members will make problems 
more visible and hold each more other accountable to 
solving these problems, and thereby help avoid financial 
crises. Despite the rapid growth of the use of peer review 
in a variety of transnational settings, its effectiveness is 
far from guaranteed. Indeed, the mixed performance of 
peer review in these different settings suggests that there 
are variations in the organizational properties of peer 
reviews that are important to consider if peer review is 
to be used successfully by the FSB. 
Drawing on a growing literature on transnational peer 
review and on insights from a recent workshop organized 
by Thomas Conzelmann and Kerstin Martens that 
compared peer review processes1, this note highlights 
a challenge in the use of peer review that should be 
addressed if it is to be successful at the FSB. Peer review 
1  For more information, see http://www. fdcw. 
unimaas. nl/staff/files/users/277/Programme-Workshop_
Peer_Reviews_final. pdf
has two aspects, both of which are important but not 
easily reconciled. One aspect involves the exercise of 
power and accountability, and the development of 
linkages with actors and institutions external to the peer 
review process. All of these can involve control, threats 
and interests. The other aspect involves the learning, 
collegiality, autonomy and trust that can develop among 
a group of like-minded officials, and that can be crucial 
to the genuine dialogue that is needed in peer review. 
These also can lead the process to be unaccountable, 
however, and weaken its external influence. Peer review 
is unlikely to be successful if these two aspects of peer 
review are not reconciled adequately. It is important to 
address this challenge early in the development of the 
FSB’s peer review. 
It is useful first to reflect on the reasons for the upswing in 
reliance on transnational peer review in many settings in 
recent years. Traditional international law, which usually 
involves very lengthy formal negotiating processes that 
then lock in commitments at a particular point in time, is 
not well suited to a world in which problems, interests, 
and the relevant actors are not clearly defined and are 
changing rapidly. In contrast, peer review, when it works, 
can establish new shared expectations and commitments 
on an ongoing basis by engaging states in a collective 
process that simultaneously produces learning and 
accountability. Traditional formal international law and 
institutions ultimately rely for their effectiveness upon 
their support from states and other actors, and there is 
no reason in principle that collective action coordinated 
informally could not be as effective at deterring 
irresponsible behaviour. 
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Power and Accountability 
It is clear that power and accountability can play 
an important role in peer review. This is evident, 
for instance, in the way that incentives provided by 
powerful states and deployed outside the peer review 
process can encourage weaker actors to engage in peer 
review. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)-initiated Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes, which has recently adopted a strong form 
of peer review that prevents reviewed states from 
blocking mandatory publication of reports, has enjoyed 
remarkable success in its work against tax evasion, but 
non-compliant offshore centres are strongly motivated 
to participate by the threat of the G20 and other states 
taking action against them if they do not. 
Demands for accountability for funds provided 
by wealthier states are a crucial motivation for the 
DAC/UNEG Peer Reviews of Evaluation Functions 
in Multilateral Organizations, which has reviewed 
UNICEF, UNDP, the UN Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, and the Global Environment Fund. The 
promise of funding conferred momentum on adhesion 
to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). When 
EU funding linked to the APRM ran out, the review 
process in countries that were attracted by the promise 
of more money slowed noticeably. 2 
The EU has also been able to require potential members 
to the Union to engage in peer review as a condition of 
accession. The OECD’s peer review originated in the 
process of “confrontation” that developed through its 
2  Comments on the APRM are informed by the work 
of Faten Aggad. 
predecessor’s involvement in the distribution of Marshall 
Plan funds. These examples of the role played by power 
in peer review should encourage careful consideration 
of the role of power in the FSB’s own operations. 
Since the FSB membership corresponds so closely to the 
most powerful group of states, the G20, it is clear that no 
group of states can provide the types of external incentives 
noted above to make the FSB’s peer review of its own 
members work. There are ways the power associated with 
the FSB’s members can be linked to peer review to address 
this problem. First, the choice of thematic topics can foster 
accountability and compliance if, over time, they reflect the 
concerns of different powerful subgroups of G20 members. 
Any set of powerful members can then exercise the implicit 
threat to not engage seriously with a topic of primary 
concern to others if other powerful members do not engage 
seriously with topics of primary concern to them. Ideally 
the topics would motivate subgroups that vary enough in 
their membership to not solidify into longer-term blocs. 
Second, the membership of the FSB should not be fully 
fixed. Ideally all states’ membership rights should 
automatically lapse over a cycle of five years and 
require renewal. Similarly, explicit or implicit gradations 
in membership rights should be established. For 
instance, only members engaged in good faith efforts 
to comply should be allowed to serve on the Steering 
Committee, peer review teams, Standing Committees or 
working groups. Challenging membership renewals or 
restricting membership rights are more credible threats 
than expulsion. The appointment of FSB members to 
influential roles in other standard-setting bodies could 
increasingly be linked to their good faith efforts to 
engage in FSB peer review processes. 
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The role of power in the relationship of the FSB to 
non-member states is also important. Over time, the 
FSB can follow the OECD’s example by involving 
expanding numbers of non-members in its peer reviews. 
Conditional access to FSB consultations and other FSB 
processes can provide an incentive for non-members to 
engage in such reviews. This would be enhanced if there 
was some turnover in FSB membership and engagement 
in such reviews was a condition for entry into the FSB. 
Reconciling Learning and 
Accountability 
While it is important to mobilize power to support 
the effectiveness of peer review, if power, interests, 
and demands for accountability are pursued too 
aggressively, this can undermine the learning side 
of peer review. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) appears 
to provide less genuine opportunities for learning than 
comparable reviews at the OECD because of worries 
by states that admissions of weaknesses could be used 
against them in formalized WTO disputes. The less 
assertive role of the secretariat in the TPRM exacerbates 
this (Conzelmann, 2008). 
The FSB could address this problem by ensuring that part 
of its peer process is confidential, making the boundary 
between this and what is made public something that 
the reviewed member has to justify and negotiate in each 
case. The compliance mechanisms mentioned above 
should not be linked too directly to any particular peer 
review, nor to any particular shortcoming revealed by a 
review, but rather to the good faith efforts of states to 
engage with peer review processes over time. A strong 
secretariat that is committed to the learning aspects of 
peer review has played a crucial role in the successful 
use of peer review at the OECD. Attention should be 
given to further strengthening the FSB’s secretariat while 
avoiding the insularity for which IMF staff has been 
criticized (Momani, 2007). Appointing staff from diverse 
backgrounds, including some with a strong record of 
independent research, will help. 
How can linkages to other actors and institutions be 
configured to maximize the effectiveness of the FSB’s 
peer review? The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
conducted by the UN Human Rights Council addresses 
sensitive issues, and yet states have agreed to webcasting 
of their responses to the reviews. Similarly, one of the 
more successful aspects of the APRM is the way that it has 
engaged civil society actors in some countries. By having 
knowledgeable officials challenge one another, requiring 
reasons for their conduct, and thereby allowing external 
actors to understand and respond to the issues at stake, 
peer review can reduce the risk that networks of officials 
will be unaccountable or captured by business interests 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). 
It is important for the FSB that enough of the debate that 
is produced by the peer review process be made public 
so that non-state actors, including media, can amplify 
and develop it. The recent thematic FSB peer review 
on compensation provides valuable information about 
differences in implementation across G20 members, 
but there is a risk that even with this potentially more 
newsworthy topic it will not be picked up and amplified 
by non-state actors unless links with those actors are 
actively encouraged. 
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Macroprudential 
Policies and the 
Cycle
Philip Turner
The term macroprudential was first used in Basel 
Committee discussions at the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in the late 1970s but its precise 
meaning remains elusive. The idea was to get bank 
supervisors to look beyond the risk position of 
individual institutions to risks affecting the system 
as a whole. There are many reasons why such risks 
are not simply an aggregation of individual risks. 
Two words are frequently used to characterize these 
reasons: “externalities” and “pro-cyclicality. ”
“Externalities” covers many distinct dimensions. 
• Interconnections between banks and between 
different markets. Nowadays banks do not 
deal with each other in atomistic, perfectly 
competitive markets – if they ever did. Many of 
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets 
in which banks trade are dominated by a few 
large players. We discovered in the crisis that 
these markets had created such large but opaque 
links between banks that the failure of a single 
major counterparty could threaten the whole 
system (“contagion”). 
• Network effects, which are imperfectly 
understood, can mean that the failure of even a 
small bank or even an obscure market can trigger 
a cascading effect through the whole system. 
Common exposures or uniform responses to 
shocks can magnify such effects. 
• Market power. Banks try to develop new 
products that will allow them to earn (possibly 
temporary) economic rents. The greater the 
heterogeneity or opacity of their products, the 
easier it is for them to earn rents from price 
discrimination between customers. 
Because such externalities are so widespread in these 
markets, it is not enough for regulators to look only at 
the risk profiles of individual banks or at the workings 
of specific markets. 
“Procyclicality” refers to the tendency of the financial 
system to amplify macroeconomic or global financial 
shocks. The bank regulatory system is only one possible 
source of cyclicality. Real capital formation is likely to be 
cyclical because it is stimulated when demand outruns 
existing capacity; market prices are cyclical; accounting 
conventions that are backward looking can accentuate pro-
cyclicality … and so on and so forth. The simple point is that 
the aim of public policy cannot be to eliminate cyclicality 
but rather to protect the financial system from it. 
All agree on the need for such a broader vision – but the 
problem is to design operational policies. The list of policies 
that could be used in a macroprudential way is very long. 
Table 1 below summarizes 10 measures that are at present 
in force in some countries or are under consideration. Note 
that measures that have in the past been used tend to be 
country-specific, often because basic features of the structure 
of financial intermediation differ from country to country. 
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The very diversity of this list is itself instructive. 
Consider this advice: a good prudential regulator 
should pay particular attention to limiting aggregate 
risk exposures which build up during booms and which 
create problems when conditions turn adverse. It is not 
difficult to construct a plausible narrative weaving in 
several quite distinct elements of risk:
• As demand rises above trend, firms become 
more optimistic about future sales – and 
banks, as defaults on loans fall, become more 
willing to lend; 
• When borrowing conditions in markets become 
unusually favourable, local firms and banks 
find they can borrow more easily or more 
cheaply at (low) short-term rates or in foreign 
currency. When the interest rate or exchange 
rate cycle turns, however, they find themselves 
exposed to currency mismatches or maturity 
mismatches or both; 
• Higher asset prices give borrowers extra 
collateral against which to borrow, and often 
bloat bank balance sheets with unsustainable 
capital gains; and
• Lower price volatility of financial assets during 
upswings leads to reduced haircuts on wholesale 
funding contracts, facilitating increased leverage. 
When volatility rises during downswings, 
haircuts rise and force investors to scale back 
their leverage, implying a sharp contraction of 
their positions. The decline in asset prices that 
results has further feedback effects on the balance 
sheets of banks and other investors. 





Bank loans Caps on loan-to-value for mortgages
Caps on the ratio of debt-service-to-
household income
Rules on the reference interest rate used 
for mortgage lending





Countercyclical capital ratios 
Adjustment to risk weights
Rules on loan-loss provisioning
Caps on loan-to-deposit ratios, core 
funding ratio and other liquidity 
requirements






Prevention of procyclical variation 
in minimum margins or haircuts (or 
making such variation countercyclical)
This simplified narrative raises at least six 
elements that could destabilize the economy – 
the cyclical path of GDP, asset price volatility, 
currency mismatches, maturity mismatches, 
bank balance sheet management and collateral 
practices in wholesale markets. One implication of 
the existence of so many distinct elements is that 
macroprudential policies cannot be characterized 
in a unidimensional way. Such policies are bound 
to be multidimensional. This makes designing an 
operational framework challenging. Three strategic 
questions seem important: how far prudential ratios 
should change through the cycle; how the mix 
of instruments should be decided; and how such 
policies would relate to macroeconomic policies. 
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Three Strategic Questions 
i) Ratios to Vary With the Cycle? 
A first, major issue is whether prudential ratios or 
standards should be fixed or should vary with the cycle. 
Such variation could be based on a predetermined rule. 
Or it could be decided in a discretionary way by the 
authority responsible for prudential oversight. 
One important point to bear in mind is that fixed ratios 
can themselves act as automatic stabilisers. 1 The tax 
system works as an automatic stabilizer: indeed, many 
studies of fiscal policy have shown that automatic 
stabilizers have worked better in stabilizing the economy 
than discretionary policy actions. 
Setting prudential ratios that vary with the cycle could in 
theory make them more powerful stabilizers. But there 
are formidable technical difficulties. Is it the real economic 
cycle (i. e. GDP) that is to be stabilized or is it some form 
of financial cycle? There is no shortage in the supply of 
statistical variables suggested by economists to proxy 
the financial cycle – bank credit, asset prices, borrowing 
conditions in capital markets and so on. But how should 
these different elements be weighted together? Is there a 
way of extracting in a timely manner the financial cycle 
(i. e. “excesses” of credit growth, “overshooting” of asset 
prices, “overabundant” liquidity) from normal cyclical 
variation and longer-term trends? Financial innovation 
and the rise of new industries mean that models based 
on past behaviour need to be used with discernment. 
1 Whether particular ratios are or are not stabilizing 
is an empirical question. One useful approach is to use 
macroeconomic models to back-test particular ratios and 
examine whether a particular ratio would have stabilized 
the real economy or not. 
The official sector may not be any more able to forecast 
the cycle than is the private sector. Because diversity of 
opinion is more likely to be stabilizing than uniformity, 
there is some presumption against having a single official 
body judge the cycle. Will it prove possible to act quickly 
enough for measures taken to have countercyclical 
effects? There is a danger of being inadvertently pro-
cyclical given the length of recognition, decision and 
implementation lags of regulatory policies. The longer 
it takes to bring new prudential ratios into force, the 
greater the risk that measures are mistimed. 
There are also limits to the capacity of the official sector to 
persuade the public about the cycle. In a deep recession, 
for instance, a macroprudential-focused regulator might 
want to relax prudential ratios on banks. But the general 
public’s worries about the future may discourage banks 
from following such easing. The old adage of monetary 
policy “pushing on a string” might well apply to 
regulatory policy easing in a slump. 
One compromise in the debate about fixed ratios versus 
those that move with the cycle might be to define quite 
wide “corridors of stability” within which the target 
(such as GDP) would be stabilized. When the target 
is within that corridor, the ratio would remain fixed. 
Only when the target goes outside that corridor would 
a cyclical change in the ratio be considered. Judgement 
could still be required to set aside a rule or to calibrate 
policy action. And a major exercise in public persuasion 
would still have to be undertaken. 
(ii) Choice of Instruments 
A second issue concerns the strategy that should guide 
the choice of instruments. As noted, there are very many 
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instruments that might qualify for macroprudential use. 
This strategic choice has many dimensions:
• Many or few instruments? By analogy with the 
welfare economics of taxation, the use of a 
greater number of instruments in a modest 
way could be less distortionary than heavy 
reliance on just a few instruments. As a lower 
tax rate applied over a wider field (e. g. income, 
consumption, wealth, etc. ) is less distortionary 
than a high tax rate narrowly applied, milder 
regulatory imposition on a large number of 
financial markets/products can be more efficient. 
On the other hand, there are major drawbacks 
in having too many instruments. One is that 
a greater number of instruments could make 
calibration much harder – particularly since 
we have little or no historical experience of the 
complexity of the interactions between rules on 
different instruments. A second drawback is that 
the imposition of too many macroprudential 
constraints runs the risk of inadvertent 
overregulation. 
• How sector specific? One temptation is to target 
sectors deemed to be most “overheated. ” But 
this runs the obvious risk of official credit 
allocation. So it seems better for any target to be 
defined broadly (e. g. total property lending). 
• How bank specific? It would be difficult to explain 
to a bank a tightening of regulation dictated 
purely by macroeconomic developments. The 
banker would say, “Yes, I am also concerned 
about (say) overheated property markets, which 
is why I’ve already directed loan officers to 
tighten lending standards. But my competitor 
has not. ” This may mean that some bank-
specific elements will have to enter into any 
macroprudential policy. 
(iii) Relation with Other Policies
A third issue is the relationship between macroprudential 
and macroeconomic policies. In many cases, financial 
excesses will be the symptom of lax fiscal, exchange rate 
or monetary policies. So there is a risk that addressing 
the symptoms of such policy failings by tightening 
rules on banks and others may just delay effective 
macroeconomic correction. 
In other cases (perhaps rare), macroeconomic and 
macroprudential policies may need to move in opposite 
directions. In the event of a positive productivity shock, 
for example, monetary policy might need to ease in 
response to a decline in underlying inflation pressure, 
while macroprudential policy may have to tighten if 
a productivity shock has increased financial risks by 
promoting speculative borrowing in new, uncertain areas. 
Matters would be further complicated if macroprudential 
settings were to be adjusted in response to cyclical 
developments. Central banks setting monetary 
policy would need to know how and when cyclical 
developments are likely to influence macroprudential 
policies, which in turn affect economic prospects. 
Macroprudential settings will in general influence 
credit supply conditions, and therefore monetary policy 
transmission. Successful macroprudential policy may 
reduce the amplitude of the business cycles that involve 
significant financial cycles. At the same time, such 
policies could also reduce the potency of interest rates 
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in managing aggregate demand. Inducing movements 
in asset prices is one way monetary policy influences 
aggregate demand – attempting to moderate such effects 
could weaken monetary policy transmission. 
Conclusion 
There is no simple answer that would apply in all 
circumstances to any of the three strategic questions 
– Should prudential ratios vary with the cycle? 
Which instruments would work best? How will other 
polices be affected?
The evidence about how different instruments have 
worked is rather sparse and much of it is country-specific. 
Therefore policy makers considering macroprudential 
policies will have to make the best decision on the basis 
of very imperfect information. Many policies that work 
well in one jurisdiction may not work well in another 
– so there will not be an international consensus that 
covers all instruments. There will be no lack of public 
criticism – particularly when policy makers decide on 
restrictive policies. The inherent uncertainties both in 
measuring systemic risks and in any quantification of 
the impact of new preventative measures will make it 
hard for regulators to justify their policies to the public. 
Are these reasons for doing nothing? No. They do of 
course constitute good reason for realistically limiting 
ambitions. The economic or financial cycle cannot be 
abolished. Macroprudential is not an easy substitute 
for other policies. But the intellectual case for a 
macroprudential perspective is nevertheless compelling. 
What is needed, however, is dispassionate analysis of 
the policy options and a willingness to adapt as new 
information emerges. 
A recent report of a Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) (2010) study group led by David 
Longworth, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Canada, is an excellent example of such analysis. This 
group examined how changes in margining practices 
in OTC derivative markets could reduce procyclicality 
in the financial system. The terms on which leveraged 
market participants get lending for their position taking 
in securities markets can be extremely pro-cyclical. 
Hence consideration of this is absolutely central for 
macroprudential policies. The report recommended six 
policy options. Four were recommended outright. But 
two of them were recommended “for consideration” – 
indicating the need for further thinking, including about 
implementation. Each recommendation had its pros and 
cons clearly laid out. 
The suggestions made are practical and specific. 
Among them: haircuts and initial margin requirements 
should be set more conservatively but should be 
more stable throughout the cycle; settlement through 
risk-proofed central counterparties would reduce 
destabilizing market reactions due to worries about 
counterparty risks; capital requirements on securities 
financing for banks should normally be relatively stable 
through the cycle. Of course banks and policy makers 
would go through a learning-by-experiment process in 
implementing such proposals. 
The conclusion to draw from this is quite general: give 
well-reasoned proposals for reform a try. Be ready to 
reassess as new information comes in. New policies 
inevitably involve trial and error – and the lack of decisive 
prior evidence on how they would work in practice is not 
a reason for not acting when the likely alternative is worse. 
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Counter-cyclicality: 
The New Consensus, 
How it Could be 
Implemented2 
Stephany Griffith-Jones
Financial regulation is very important in a market 
economy, given its influence on the level of credit and 
its evolution through time. Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) 
emphasized that the level of credit is the critical variable 
in the determination of output and employment. Indeed, 
the important role of credit has been underestimated by 
academics and policy makers. To the extent that credit 
is an important macroeconomic variable, good and 
effective regulation becomes an essential policy tool. 
The need for regulation to be counter-cyclical was 
initially recognized by only a small and fairly isolated 
group of academics and some international institutions, 
like the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin American and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) and 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). However, 
after the global crisis which began in 2007 became acute, 
international commitment by policy makers to counter-
cyclical regulation became widespread. 
2  This note draws on the paper written jointly with 
Jose Antonio Ocampo and Ariane Ortiz “Building on 
the countercyclical consensus: a policy agenda,” www. 
policydialogue. org, funded by the Foundation for 
European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). I 
am also grateful for valuable discussions on this subject 
with Jane D’Arista. 
Counter-cyclical regulation needs to be an important 
part of economic strategies aimed at stabilizing the 
economy by reducing the pro-cyclicality of finance and 
its effects on the real economy. It does so by explicitly 
incorporating the impact of macroeconomic risks, and 
changing crucial regulatory variables in a counter-
cyclical way to discourage lending booms and prevent 
credit crunches. 
As rhetorical agreement on implementing counter-
cyclical regulation is very broad amongst policy makers, 
there is also ever-growing consensus that it is not enough 
to reduce pro-cyclicality of existing regulations (like 
Basel II). It is also essential to design strictly counter-
cyclical regulations, to offset the natural tendency of 
banking and financial markets towards boom-bust 
patterns. The key questions are now practical; how best 
should counter-cyclical regulation be implemented? 
Initially, there was a debate about what instruments 
would best be used to achieve regulatory counter-
cyclicality, especially in solvency requirements, but also 
for liquidity. There is now increasing agreement that 
several instruments need to be used in parallel. 
In the case of solvency, those instruments would 
include counter-cyclical capital requirements and loan 
provisioning or non-distributable reserves, as well as 
counter-cyclical leverage ratios and loan-to-value ratios. 
An alternative for the latter are rules to adjust the values 
of collateral for cyclical price variations, especially for 
real estate prices. 
The only problem with using such a large array of 
instruments may be their excessive complexity, which 
partly reflects the complexity of problems posed by the 
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financial system. An alternative, more direct approach 
would be for regulators to limit the growth of bank 
credit. This could become relevant if the more indirect 
counter-cyclical regulation instruments discussed above 
were not sufficiently effective. 
Counter-cyclical provisions have the virtue that they 
have already been implemented successfully by the 
Spanish authorities for almost ten years. They provide 
an excellent precedent for other countries. They are 
clearly very valuable, especially for strengthening banks, 
though apparently less effective in curbing excessive 
expansion of credit. One problem has been tensions 
between implementing counter-cyclical provisions and 
accounting rules, initially moderated in Spain because 
the Banco de España designs accounting rules. However 
the dialogue between international regulatory bodies and 
accounting associations after the global crisis is helping 
ease this problem more widely. It is also interesting that, 
though availability of good and long-term data eased the 
implementation of counter-cyclical provisions in Spain, 
Spanish experts argue that simulations may be used for 
countries that do not have such good data. 
An important choice is whether counter-cyclicality 
should be implemented through rules or in a 
discretionary way. There seems to be an overall 
preference for predetermined rules that will reduce the 
risk of regulatory capture, either by narrow interests 
or by the over-enthusiasm that characterizes booms. 
It seems best if rules could be tightened, in special 
circumstances, but never loosened during booms. 
Appropriate indicators (such as growth of credit and/
or asset prices) need to be chosen to ensure counter-
cyclical capital buffers vary effectively with the cycle. 
Though assuring enough capital, provisions and reserves 
are key for financial stability, so is liquidity, even though 
the latter has been less discussed. Prudential regulation 
needs to ensure adequate levels of liquidity for financial 
intermediaries. One good way of doing it is to set 
liquidity requirements based on the residual maturity of 
financial institutions’ liabilities. 
As solvency and liquidity are complementary, there may 
be a case for implementing requirements jointly, which 
would imply requiring more capital in a counter-cyclical 
way for institutions with large maturity mismatches. 
However, as capital will never be enough to deal with 
serious liquidity problems, there is a clear case for having 
a separate liquidity requirement. 
As regards accounting disclosure rules, these should 
satisfy both the needs of investors and those of financial 
stability. An optimal approach may be to rely on a dual 
disclosure approach, where both current profits and 
losses are reported, as well as profits after deducting 
forward looking provisions or a non-distributable 
Economic Cycle Reserve that set aside profits in good 
years for likely losses in the future. 
There are some important trade-offs between stronger 
and more counter-cyclical regulation and access to credit. 
Such stronger regulation will result in higher spreads 
in domestic financial intermediation. They may result 
in a suboptimal supply of financing, especially in the 
supply of long-term credit for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, additional instruments 
may be necessary to provide sufficient and sufficiently 
long-term, credit – particularly to SMEs, such as 
public development banks. Higher spreads may also 
generate incentives for corporations with direct access 
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to international capital markets to borrow abroad, thus 
increasing the likelihood of currency mismatches in 
the portfolios of these agents. Hence there is a need for 
international coordination of regulatory policies, as well 
as specific policies to deal with currency mismatches in 
financial portfolios. 
To avoid regulatory arbitrage, the comprehensiveness 
of counter-cyclical regulation is an important issue, 
both nationally and internationally. The best approach 
is equivalent comprehensive counter-cyclical regulation 
for all institutions, instruments and markets. This would 
include also all non-banking financial institutions, such 
as hedge funds and investment banks (the so-called 
“shadow banking system”), as well as all instruments 
within banks by consolidating all activities onto the 
balance sheet. It should also include counter-cyclical 
margin and collateral requirements on all securities and 
derivatives instruments. 
Counter-cyclical regulation needs to be implemented 
nationally, as cycles vary by countries; they should be 
implemented by host countries. However, the broad 
criteria need to be defined nationally or regionally 
(for example, within the European Union) but 
coordinated internationally, as markets are subject 
to contagion. Thus, a crisis in another important 
country (especially if an important creditor, debtor, 
or trade partner) can seriously harm financial stability 
or output in countries that themselves have not 
accumulated systemic risk. Therefore, in a globalized 
economy, all countries have a legitimate concern to 
avoid pro-cyclical excesses in other countries. 
The case for international coordination for defining broad 
criteria for counter-cyclical regulation is therefore strong. 
This requires a considerable strengthening of regional 
and global regulatory institutional arrangements. A 
global financial regulator, though hard to achieve, may 
be an essential institutional development, if global 
financial markets and institutions are to be effectively 
regulated, and international regulatory arbitrage 
avoided. It is important that such a global regulator 
is broadly representative, including of developing 
countries. The FSB provides the basis for such a global 
financial regulator. 
A final point relates to the timing of introducing counter-
cyclical and stronger regulations. It is important to agree 
on such regulations in the wake of a crisis, when the 
political appetite for regulatory reform is highest. This 
will also help restore confidence in the financial system. 
However, such rules should begin to operate gradually 
and only after the economy is clearly recovering and 
financial institutions have become stronger. This will 
prevent the undesired effect of tighter regulation 
worsening or prolonging a credit crunch in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis. 
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A. Conceptual Issues 
The financial crisis showed that, in practice, financial 
regulation has been founded on a fallacy of composition, 
assuming that making each bank safe makes the 
financial system safe. 
Microprudential regulation, the main component of 
traditional financial sector regulation and a necessary 
condition for sound bank regulation, is a “bottom-up” 
approach that focuses on the health and stability of 
individual institutions, examining their response to 
exogenous risks. However, microprudential regulation 
does not incorporate endogenous risk and ignores the 
systemic importance of individual institutions resulting 
from factors such as size, degree of leverage and 
interconnectedness across intermediaries and markets, 
both domestically and internationally. 
Macroprudential surveillance should aim at 
preserving systemic financial stability by identifying 
vulnerabilities in a country’s financial system early, and 
triggering policy and regulatory actions in a timely and 
informed manner so as to reduce economy-wide risk 
associated with the working of the financial system as 
a whole. It is a “top-down” approach that focuses on 
the macroeconomic, regulatory and legal environment 
in which the financial system operates. 
A critical macroprudential concern is the state of the 
business cycle, and more specifically, the credit/asset 
price cycle. This derives from the high correlation that 
exists between the economic cycle up (down) phase 
and rising (falling) market asset prices as well as with 
falling (rising) risk measurement in the markets, which 
tend to amplify the cycle by the endogenous behavior of 
individual financial entities. Furthermore, during booms 
(busts) both financial institutions and products appear to 
be safer (riskier) than they are. 
Most consensuses on macroprudential regulation have 
evolved around the need (a) that capital requirements 
(to cover unexpected losses) and loan-loss provisions 
(to cover expected losses) should have a counter-cyclical 
component; (b) that rules should be preferred to discretion 
(to minimize political pressure on supervisors); and (c) 
that these rules should include limits on banks’ leverage 
ratios and liquidity buffers. 
Regarding (a), most of the proposals suggest relating 
banks’ capital requirements (i) to the growth of bank 
credit (by comparing the actual growth to some value 
coherent with a country’s inflation target or other macro 
target or anchor). Many proposals add that capital 
requirements should be determined differentially 
according to banks’ activities (additional capital 
should be required when engaging in risky proprietary 
trading activities, off balance sheet operations and re-
securitizations, which tend to be procyclical); borrowing 
sectors (real estate lending is prone to generate a price 
bubble) and/or direct borrowers (changing maximum 
loan-to-value ratios on commercial and residential 
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mortgages for risk weighting purposes, according to 
market conditions); and (ii) to the maturity mismatch 
of bank assets and liabilities. Regarding provisions, 
considering that risks tend to build up undetected 
during expansions and then materialize in downturns, 
most of the proposals suggest introducing forward-
looking ex-ante provisions for loan losses at the moment 
in which the loan is granted; these “dynamic” provisions 
should work as automatic stabilizers and mitigate pro-
cyclicality of standard loan loss provisioning. 
Regarding (b), the experience of Emerging Economies 
(EE) suggests that discretion should not only be 
allowed but encouraged, since on many occasions 
rules cannot capture in a timely and forceful way, the 
speed and strength of cycle phases which require an 
extra-discretionary – force to make counter-cyclical 
regulation more effective. 
In addition to variables specific to the banking/financial 
sector, recent research in developed countries shows that 
very low interest rates over an extended period of time 
may be conducive to under-pricing of risk, excessive 
increase in leverage, increase in bank risk-taking and 
the emergence of asset price bubbles. This suggests that 
bank supervisors should strengthen the macroprudential 
perspective to financial stability by intensifying their 
vigilance of sustained low interest rates, particularly 
when accompanied by other signs of risk taking, such as 
rapid credit and asset price increases. 
This latter finding is coherent with EE experience: if key 
macro prices (mainly real interest rates and exchange 
rates) become outliers, their reversal could seriously 
affect the financial system soundness and solvency. 
Therefore, macro prudential regulation should go 
further than incorporating the economic cycle and banks’ 
maturity mismatches in the financial regulation scheme. 
In particular, the real exchange rate has on several occasions 
moved dramatically away, and for quite a long period of 
time, from any reasonable long-term equilibrium value, 
contributing not only to a balance of payment crisis but 
also to a banking crisis. More specifically, even when the 
fiscal position is sound, unsustainable booms have been 
generated by increases in aggregate demand “financed” 
by short-term foreign financial inflows. The latter 
magnitude and speed overheats the economy, creating 
asset price bubbles and artificially maintaining inflation 
low and the domestic currency appreciated. 
With increasing globalization, short-term foreign inflows 
are not always intermediated by the domestic financial 
system, going directly to non-financial enterprises and/
or the stock market. Thus, although banks may not 
show higher leverage or rapid growth in credit, price 
assets equally increase and the current account of the 
balance of payments equally deteriorates. When the 
boom ends and capital inflows are replaced by capital 
outflows, domestic currency devaluation usually affects 
bank debtor’s capacity to serve their debt. And so, even 
if banks did not intermediate the bulk of short-term 
capital inflows, did not have a maturity mismatch and 
appeared not to have a currency mismatch, a significant 
devaluation may originate or amplify a banking crisis. 
This occurs especially if domestic debtors, engaged in 
non-tradable activities, have their bank liabilities in 
foreign currency. To minimize this effect, bank regulation 
should incorporate a limit to currency mismatch, which 
should consider the sensitivity of banks’ borrowers to 
exchange rate movements. 
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EE experience has shown that targeting the capital 
account of the balance of payments (appropriately 
adjusted for the stock of foreign debt and international 
reserves) and sending early warning signals when it 
exceeds certain critical values, has helped smoothen the 
economic cycle and prevented the real exchange rate 
from deviating significantly and/or for a long time from 
its equilibrium value, thus contributing to the health of 
the banking system. 
To face an “excessive” appreciation of the domestic 
currency originating in huge short-term capital inflows, 
standard policy measures include an improvement in 
the fiscal accounts, increasing international reserves, 
lowering domestic interest rates and allowing for more 
capital outflows. However, in EE there is not much room 
for tightening fiscal policy or for increasing the level of 
international reserves, while lowering domestic interest 
rates acts against the control of inflation, and liberalizing 
capital outflows may end up stimulating even further 
capital inflows. If these standard policy measures are 
not available, countries need to regulate the amount 
and speed of short-term capital inflows. In summary, 
EE should be prepared, when first-best macro policies 
are not available, to put “sand in the wheels” (taxes) 
to short-term capital inflows, including carry-trade 
transactions. These not “first-best” policies may be the 
only real and pragmatic option to reduce the probability 
of a major financial shock originating in excessive short-
term capital inflows. 
Considering that many EE have been opening 
their capital accounts and that new internationally 
tradable financial instruments are to a major extent 
nontransparent and difficult to trace, the institutional 
set-up and technical capabilities to formulate and 
implement efficient regulations on short-term capital 
inflows are quite demanding. 
In short, preventing financial sector instability and crisis 
in EE requires more than appropriate local financial 
micro and macroprudential regulation addressed at 
dampening the pro-cyclicality of the domestic banking 
sector. It requires some sort of international financial 
flows regulation, currently non-existent. The role of the 
IMF on multilateral supervision of global imbalances, 
which started in 2006, went in the right direction but 
lacked both enforcement and accountability. Lacking 
international financial flows regulation, the agenda on 
macroprudential regulation should incorporate the 
legitimacy of national policies to apply regulations on 
short-term financial inflows. 
B. Institutional Issues 
After the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the principle that 
financial liberalization should be accompanied by stronger 
prudential regulation and supervision became generally 
agreed. Although there were many meetings and papers 
on a “new international financial architecture,” and while 
some progress was made on issues such as formulating 
standards of good practice in corporate governance, bank 
supervision, financial accounting and data dissemination, 
the main structural weaknesses of the international 
financial system were not properly addressed. In 
particular, although financial regulation – domestic 
and international – should have been comprehensive 
regarding institutions, instruments and markets, so as 
to minimize them being circumvented by non-banking 
intermediation, the recent financial crisis exposed the 
weakness of the international financial architecture. 
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Global institutions failed to conduct effective 
macrofinancial surveillance of systemically important 
economies (US, UK and the eurozone) and to provide 
compelling warnings; and fragmented international 
arrangements proved to be ineffective regarding 
regulation, supervision and resolution of internationally 
active financial institutions, instruments and markets. 
The present voluntary cooperative efforts at the 
international level are not adequate. The international 
financial community needs to make progress with a 
binding global financial order. The crisis has demonstrated 
that even countries with strong financial systems can feel 
the effects of inadequate regulatory regimes elsewhere. 
In fact, countries may hesitate to impose new appropriate 
requirements on their own institutions if these measures 
will create competitive disadvantage. This reinforces the 
importance of strengthening international coordination, 
review and surveillance. 
One main challenge is that regulatory reform will 
take time since the issues are not only technically very 
demanding but politically complicated, considering the 
reduction of sovereignty in the regulation of national 
financial markets that might and should come from 
stricter global rules. And the reform proposals of the 
European Union – with the soon-to-be established 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) – and the 
US, which have been advancing quite rapidly, are not 
necessarily coherent with the required global criteria for 
financial regulation. 
Another challenge at the international level, and very 
probably for the FSB, is to turn high-level commitments 
to improve early warning systems, surveillance and peer 
review into robust international arrangements which 
will empower the FSB to produce wholly independent 
analysis of system-wide risks, and which will require 
major countries, whose financial systems have systemic 
international impact, to take such reports seriously as 
inputs to domestic macroeconomic and macroprudential 
policy decisions. 
The FSB, to be responsible for assessing macroprudential 
risk worldwide and proposing counter-cyclical 
regulatory policies, should be independent in carrying 
out its tasks and pursuing its objective. The fact 
that the FSB would probably not be involved in the 
implementation of these recommendations strengthens 
the argument for its policy independence. 
The final responsibility for implementing the FSB 
recommendations would probably remain with national 
supervisors. This implies that a main institutional 
challenge relates to the effective monitoring of the 
follow-up of the FSB warnings and recommendations 
and their consistent and timely implementation; this will 
be crucial for the performance and credibility of the new 
macroprudential supervisory framework. 
The FSB should work in close cooperation with the BIS 
and IMF; this would ensure an appropriate interplay 
at the international level between the macro and micro 
prudential levels. Furthermore, the FSB could be initially 
assisted by the BIS and the IMF in the provision of 
analytical and statistical support. 
The FSB, regarding macroprudential and counter-cyclical 
policies, could be assigned the task of being consulted 
prior to the new responsibilities which will probably be 
assigned to the IMF: surveillance of all domestic financial 
markets with no exceptions (i. e. including those of 
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advanced economies); development of an early warning 
system; and the possibility of overriding the veto of a 
member to have a surveillance report made public. 
The FSB analysis, evaluation and proposals to mitigate 
macroprudential risk should be incorporated into the 
IMF-World Bank financial sector assessment programs, 
which should be required to be mandatory and the 
results made public. 
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The FSB: Where Do 
We Go From Here? 
Pierre L. Siklos
As we approach the second half of 2010, the best that can 
be said about the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 is 
that it focused policy makers’ attention on the need to 
match frequently uttered words about the purported 
benefits of financial globalization with deeds evaluated 
in terms of greater international cooperation in the area 
of macroprudential regulation and financial supervision. 
To be sure, at several levels, all the warning signs about 
the likelihood of a financial crisis on a global scale were 
there. Fortunately, and in spite of institutional and policy 
failures, governments and central banks responded 
forcefully and, by and large, successfully. It is, of course, 
too early to declare victory. 
How will the very policies that prevented a recurrence 
of a Great Depression be unwound? Will the same 
determination to prevent a catastrophe lead to an under-
reaction as the global economy returns to strong economic 
growth? It is striking that, while the FSB captured the 
world’s attention, and cemented a desire on the part of 
the G20 to exchange information and revisit the question 
of what ingredients are necessary to ensure that a 
repeat of the string of events of 2007-2008 is avoided in 
future, the world is no closer to effective cooperation in 
developing governing principles for a new international 
financial system than at the height of the financial crisis. 
The publication of a process, including the creation of 
a “toolkit” or “ principles,” for cooperation in the event 
of a future financial crisis with global implications is 
welcomed; but what is left out in FSB documents (for 
example, “Promoting global adherence to international 
cooperation and information exchange standards,” and 
“FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation and Crisis 
Management”) is perhaps more interesting than what 
has, to date, been agreed to. 
Economic theory is able to demonstrate quite 
convincingly that a cooperative solution is often 
superior to a coordinated solution. In this sense, the 
accomplishments of the FSB represent a promising 
start. However, economic theory has its limitations. 
Unfortunately, it ignores two important truths of the 
“real world. ” They are: democratic accountability, which 
requires, in Ronald Reagan’s famous words, that nations 
“trust, but verify,” and an understanding by all countries 
that expect to fully participate in the global financial 
system that they all play by the commonly applied rules 
of the game. The first requirement suggests perhaps 
the creation of an authority to monitor and report on 
the performance of macroeconomic policies, while the 
second requirement is based on the assumption of a set 
of “core” beliefs about the essential ingredients of sound 
economic policies. 
In principle, there were plenty of institutions capable of 
meeting both objectives but, as we are all too aware, both 
policies and institutions did not serve the international 
community well and may well have been doomed to 
do so from the start. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was born out of an internal inconsistency, namely 
the ability of governments to contain capital flows 
deemed undesirable, combined with limited exchange 
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rate flexibility that set out a role for the United States 
as a permanent lender, a position that was simply 
unsustainable. For all the talk of reviving a version of 
the Bretton Woods era, the fact is that it amounted to a 
policy regime with a very short life (1959-1973) and is 
arguably a case study of the failure of the international 
coordination of economic policies as the sine qua non of 
proper policy design. Other institutions, such as the Bank 
of International Settlements (BIS), born out of another 
global crisis early in the 20th century on a global scale, also 
did not meet the challenge of convincing policy makers 
that a financial crisis of global magnitude was inevitable, 
in spite of being one of the most vocal groups in pointing 
out that the weight of global imbalances would produce 
a disastrous outcome. 
Indeed, as the crisis developed and, as major economies 
worried that they were careening toward an economic 
precipice, there was talk of creating a new set of 
institutions, perhaps even a college of overseers, to replace 
the failed existing ones. This kind of talk is, thankfully, 
heard less frequently now but the unhappiness of what 
has transpired over the past few years has not abated. 
The desire to replace something old with something 
new is a constant refrain from politicians. Many have 
perhaps already forgotten that the IMF was heavily 
criticized well before the latest financial crisis. However, 
just as the BIS was able to recover some influence and 
find relevance among the panoply of institutions that 
have an international mandate, so has the IMF found a 
new voice as an international lender of last resort and 
potential macroprudential supervisor. 
Contrary to some who bemoan that a crisis is an 
opportunity for reform, and that the world has already 
lost this opportunity, the slow and steady return to 
some semblance of normalcy in economic activity is 
itself a chance to design a framework that is capable 
of harnessing all that has been learned about crisis 
management and resolution and ensure better outcomes 
in future. The FSB is simply the natural recognition that 
several economies have emerged as powerful players on 
the international stage ready and willing to challenge 
the “old” economic powers. One should not, however, 
underestimate the contribution of the international 
consensus on the desirability of low and stable inflation, 
fiscal rectitude, the free movement of capital and goods. 
It is doubtful that many of the BRICs who now rightfully 
occupy a seat at the table would have been able to justify 
their place had they not, to differing degrees,agreed on 
several aspects of the core beliefs of what one might call 
a desirable economic policy strategy. 
With the limitations of the past and, mindful of existing 
political constraints, what can the FSB accomplish, 
and how should it be governed? Regarding the former 
question, the FSB should:
• Lead by example. The FSB publications referred to 
above suggest that it aims to follow such a strategy;
• Assist existing institutions with responsibilities 
for managing the financial system to understand 
the sources of financial system stability and the 
limitations of economic policy strategies that seek 
to maintain it. There is little indication so far that 
the FSB is explicitly seeking to meet this challenge;
• Promote the transparency and accountability 
of economic and financial policies and offer 
assessments that indicate the extent to which 
Part III: The Challenge of Macroprudential Regulation cigionline.org 59
The Financial Stability Board: An Effective Fourth Pillar of Global Economic Governance?
individual countries can meet agreed-to 
standards of best practice. There is limited 
progress on developing a report card of sorts on 
how much transparency has been achieved. 
As far as the FSB’s governance is concerned, a few 
principles going forward might include:
• Limiting sanctions for non-compliance to 
naming and shaming. The lessons from the 
failed attempt at a Stability and Growth Pact 
for the euro area should be sufficient to prevent 
a recurrence of attempts to impose explicit 
financial penalties on wayward countries. 
• Ensure that the core principles of sound 
macroprudential management are maintained, 
internally consistent, and are periodically 
evaluated. If they stand the test of time, 
credibility will be enhanced and the negative 
repercussions of a future global crisis will be 
more muted. The lesson from the successful 
operation of monetary policy strategies 
geared to achieving low and stable inflation is 
surely an example of how credibility can buy 
flexibility and success when crisis management 
is required. More importantly, there needs to 
be clarity when it comes to the role of financial 
system stability and monetary policy. To be sure, 
financial system stability should be a principle 
to be followed but not a separate objective 
for monetary policy. Monetary policy ought 
never, of course, compromise financial stability. 
Instead, central banks ought to be encouraged 
to seek alternative monetary policy strategies 
that minimize the occurrence of conditions 
that threaten financial system stability. Price 
level targeting, for example, might be one such 
alternative that deserves serious consideration. 
The ability of policy makers to weather the next 
crisis rests on what monetary policy frameworks 
will look like in the coming years. 
• The FSB can be a useful voice to ensure that 
appropriate distance exists between central 
banks and the fiscal authorities. Where it is 
absent, the location of accountability in crisis 
situations needs to be clarified. Central banks 
cannot be open to the threat of retaliation or 
loss of autonomy because, in the absence of 
“rules of engagement,” legislatures perceive 
the central bank as overstepping the normal 
bounds of monetary policy. Moreover, the limits 
of monetary policy interventions in private 
markets need to be more clearly defined. The 
experience with quantitative or credit easing in 
many parts of the world has left many observers 
uneasy, with considerable justification, because 
the lines of responsibility between fiscal and 
monetary policy were perceived to have become 
blurred. This means, for example, that rules of 
indemnification that exist to cover “…unusual 
and exigent…” (Section 13(3), Federal Reserve 
Act) circumstances need to be clarified and 
codified in central banking legislation. 
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